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This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant Lo 
Utah Code S78w2-a-3(2)(I) as , •• appeal from, a final judgment 
regarding alimonyr child suppo.r:f :\i tal estate distribution in 
a divorce decree entered by the Second Judicial District C z. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
R e l a Jt attorney's fees and 
experts' fet-h, Utah Code Ann, §30-' ' \ as amended, 1 \*'-M } is 
attached as Exhibit Relative * ti.e issues of alimony, child 
support and th ^,..,,, assets, Utah Code Ann. §30-3 
(eff. May 2, J S>»*4 ) LS attached as Exhibit *v - . -
of gross income
 Qf a spouse, Utah Code Ann. §78-45 : 
1, 1 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
April 1 - . a * - " . * *"'% xileH -
Compla , , Record" hereinafter 
referred
 s# 
Holt filed a Verified Answer and Counterclaim * r 
S™ entered by the Court regarding 
custodyf visit^tior support in i 
and alimony -,,
 i::U;Llf t :: $600.00 by Minute Entry dated June 9, 
lljyi« i . * . : .Leu uy LUC parties. On 
1 
October 27, 1993, additional temporary Orders reducing child 
support from $1,400 to $938 based upon Nicholas Holt, the parties' 
oldest son, residing with Mr* Holt were entered by the Court, with 
a denial of Mrs. Holt's Motion to Increase of Alimony. (R. 111-
113). A pre-trial conference was held January 20, 1994, at which 
time Mrs. Holt's request for $20,000 in temporary attorney's fees 
was denied except in the amount of $3,000 and a three day trial was 
scheduled for June 1, 1994. (R. 210). From June 13 to June 15, 
1994, a trial was held before the Honorable Brent W. West, Second 
District Court Judge presiding; the Court immediately granted Mr. 
Holt a divorce, ruled on custody and visitation and reserved all 
economic issues for further consideration. (R. 240-243). On 
August 3, 1994, the Court entered its Ruling awarding alimony, 
dividing the marital estate, awarding tax exemptions and fees, and 
requesting the parties to present proposed buy-out plans for 50% of 
the Codale Stock awarded to Mrs. Holt. (R. 282-287; attached as 
Exhibit 4). Mr. Holt filed his Motion to Clarify, Supplement 
and/or Reconsider Findings, submitting a plan for redeeming Mrs. 
Holt's Codale Electric stock. (R. 298-99). Mrs. Holt filed a 
Motion to Correct Ruling and to Distribute Additional Assets for 
New Trial. (R. 304-345). Both Motions were heard November 4, 1994 
by the Court. On January 4, 1995, the Court entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the June 13-15, 1994 Trial and 
November 5, 1994 Hearing on Post-Trial Motions (R. 354-66; attached 
2 
as Exhibit 5) and the Order and Judgment (R. 367-376; attached as 
Exhibit 6 ) . On January 20, 1995, the Court entered an Order on 
Post Trial Motions (R. 386-91 ; attached as Exhibit " ) • On February 
2, 1995, Mrs. Holt filed a voluminous Rule 59 Motion and Memorandum 
(100 pages) to Alter, Amend Findings, Conclusions, Order and 
Judgment, to Distribu Jdii. .. ^ nai An set < ? I ,
 u New Trial, 
containing multiple Affidavits and Exhibit-, <. ,^m Motion 
attached as Exhibit ^, vithout Memorandum . Support). :i March 
1995, Mrs. Holi filed 
21, 1995, the Court entered . \.* Order i-:- :•'/ :': L.~. . Motions denying 
a ] I re] i--r requested r-.-v M? • M "4 \ [ ; attached ?s Exhibit 
9) On April - • •  ->ea 1. 
(R. 543). 7" - :*M * of Appeal entered a dismissal of Mrs, Holt s 
Appea ] IK. o4/j. ^:iil 20, 1995, Mrs. Holt filed an Amended 
Notice of Appeal- 31. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. D ai e a nd Vickie Holt were married December , 
19 I 2 , and were separatee 11. y I 
hereinafter ~' * . \ t- parents oi three minor children, 
the oldest of whom ••-.-• living with Dale at the time of the trial; 
the l '." yooihje i. "I • 1 t . 
2. Pursuant to the temporary order ot tiie tonit, Udie 
Holt paid to the Plaintiff temporary support of $938.00 for child 
3 
support and $600,00 for alimony. (R. 111-113). Mrs. Holt resided 
in the marital residence which has no mortgage. 
3. Ms. Holt was a homemaker during the marriage, was 
not employed, and no income was imputed to her by the trial court. 
Both parties were in their forties at the time of trial. (Finding 
23) . 
4. Mr. Holt is the president and owner of 97.6 percent 
of the shares of Codale Electric Company ("Codale"). (Finding 15). 
Codale is a distributor of a wide range of electrical products; its 
primary location is Salt Lake City, Utah. Codale had no employment 
or non-compete restriction with Mr. Holt. 
5. The parties stipulated as to the value of all of the 
marital assets, with the exception of an MG automobile and the 
value of their stock in Codale. (Finding 17). 
6. As President of Codale, Dale Holt had W-2 income 
(including taxable income related to company cars and travel 
awards) of $79,731 in 1992 (T. 76), and $80,334 in 1993 (T. 77). 
He testified that his income in 1994 would be approximately the 
same as the prior year (T. 77). In 1990 and 1991, he withdrew from 
the corporation additional income, which was used to purchase the 
property upon which the office building currently housing Codale 
and which is represented by the value of Holt Properties 
Partnership. (T. 130-131) 
4 
:;
" he * rial court found that, during the last few 
years of the man . ; parties, they expended between $3,800 
and $4,200 per month for the entire family of five for all expenses 
includinq ir payments and entertainment; the Court further; found 
y l < i l l I l i f [irir.l l e s ' w 11k i q e a i e < i i Mi . t i o l t s q r o s s 
annual paid income of approximately $80,000 per year (Finding J4). 
Mrs. Holt testified that : .* : - .** engthy period of separation 
r month of temporary 
support . ».;,;*• . debt (I" '>.!4|, The 
parties had marital debt as c : 'rin. The house in which 
modest, being valued at the 
stipulated amount i >±\: . >rHnrr 17\, 
8 Plaintiff and Defendant each had an expert witness 
JI the stock Codale 
Electric Supply, Inc. Mr. Paul Shields testified ia It; »J" 
Vickie Holt and valued the interest of the parties .»; - 4 million 
M?) . He .ii-knnwl edqed that ,  U L C I reviewinq the 
valuation report of Mr. Dave Dorton, Mr. Holt's expert * hail 
made an error -* . h initial calculation in the sum of $500,000 or 
$600, 000 I" - -ried that hi s valuation was 
dependent upon the business continuing as it had 
actively involved (T. . He acknowledged that i -
Coda] e ; \) oi i] c:i b e s i q u i f - , nuxt aid nul w 
for the company, or if enter into « non-competit 
5 
agreement on the sale of the shares (T. 387). He was unable to put 
a value on the company in either of those eventualities. He 
testified that if Mr. Holt were to compete with Codale, an 
appropriate value for Codale would be its net tangible assets (T. 
386-87) . Mr. Shields agreed that the book value of the company was 
$3.3 million dollars, and that figure assumed a sale of all the 
inventory. (T. 18-19). 
9. Mr. Dave Dorton, expert witness for the Defendant, 
testified that the orderly liquidation value of Codale was $3.2 
million dollars. (T. 183). He further testified that the company 
had one million dollars of good will, but that the entire amount of 
good will was personal to Mr. Holt. (T. 198). Mr. Dorton stated 
that Mr. Holt was the key employee, which was also reiterated by 
Mr. Shields. Mr. Dorton testified that in the absence of Dale Holt 
working in the business, liquidation value of the company would be 
the most appropriate measure of value which he stated as $2.8. 
10. Mr. Dorton's testimony was consistent with the 
testimony of Mrs. Holt's expert, Mr. Shields, who also agreed that 
the valuation of the company depended upon the actions of Dale 
Holt. Mr. Shields admitted that, if Mr. Holt left the company, it 
would destroy both the personal and business good will. According 
to Mr. Shields, it could take "forever" to derive $5.4 million 
dollars from the sale of the company without Mr. Holt. (T. 397). 
6 
He admitted that his valuations never considered the departure of 
Mr. Holt. 
-."' •'•• • •"-.•. i 1 S h i e l d s j w j » - » :i that !:  he I:: sst vaJ uat:i on method of 
a company is wha*: ^  ^.iiru i i.yer would actually be willing to pay 
for the company. {±. J3b/. 'he Court received into evidence, 
w h i c h was u n r e f u t e d , an off e r to fjuicl'irise tt:nia 1 e 1,1,1 the anu Z 
$3.3 million dollars, which had been received approximately four 
moi iths pi: i c i: to the tria ; The offer was contingent upon the 
continued association of .-. [ e Holt: | [Jlla ,i ntlt: t s Kxl'iiti i l I 4 ; "T. 
7 4 - 75) . 
1- nedj.*' testimony regarding the tax 
implication of the. i;3tr.i'^inn
 ; \& m a r i t a l esta Ie Mi Robert 
H u n t e r , : testifying :^* reha;f -• : ^s Holt, stated that 
1
 i< * * igered when * ie assets were actually 
sold , . The only poss;. n escape evtit hdvtiwi I . 
pay capital gains tax on the sale of the Codale stock would be if 
3oiu jLt . v - • -M-* childre 
\ft^r t , 
Conclusions 354-66; — . • j^. ana ^ udgemer; 
376; ) awarding each party 50% f the marital estate, awarding 
Mrs. • Oi l y pi:,»i: iTioi'ii hi all. u remarriage 
ox: cohabitation and ordering Mr. Holt - .e. month ch: 
support. 
7 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON CROSS APPEAL 
Did the District Court err, as a matter of law, by 
awarding alimony to the Defendant in the amount of $2,000 per month 
where there is no factual basis for a requisite finding of need. 
Cross-Appellant does not challenge the Findings of Fact of the 
Court with regard to the alimony issue, but rather challenges the 
Court's Conclusion of Law that there is a sufficient legal basis 
for its award of alimony. The trial court's Conclusions of Law in 
civil cases are reviewed for correctness, meaning that no 
particular deference is given to the trial court's ruling on 
questions of law. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); 
Klinqer v. Rightly, 791 P.2d 868, 879 (Utah 1990). 
ARGUMENT ON CROSS APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE RECEIVING SPOUSE MUST ESTABLISH NEED IN 
ORDER TO JUSTIFY AN AWARD* OF ALIMONY. 
It is well settled law in the State of Utah that the 
purpose of an award of alimony is to provide the receiving spouse 
with financial support to enable that spouse to enjoy, as nearly as 
possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. In 
establishing an award of alimony, the trial court is obligated to 
consider the financial conditions and needs of the receiving 
spouse, his or her ability to support him or herself, and the 
ability of the paying spouse to provide the support. Jones v. 
8 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 ;_0~5 (Utah 1985), Trial courts have a great 
uedl -if iioct^t alimony awards, but the trial court's 
conclusion of law with respect to alimony awards i s to be r .•,.••-. 
for correctness , wi th no particular difference being accorded t. . 
t lie 1.1: i.ci 1. co • Brienholt j/,. Brienholt, 2 7 6 Adv. Rpts. 38, 39 
(Utah Ct. App. October, 1995), 
::• making the assessment of need and ability to support 
' '"M-i'Sp 1 f riimben*' up'.in the trial court to take into 
consideration * ,o income that a receivina SDCI will receive from 
assets that have been awarded ' e pursuant ) 
i tne marital estate. Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841 
(Uta ^rm- 1 W?) . 
POINT II 
VICKIE HOLT CANNOT ESTABLISH THE REQUISITE 
NEED TO SUPPORT AN AWARD OF ALIMONY IN THIS 
CASE. 
The trial court found that the expenses of the entire 
h. * members where living together were 
b e twe e i - . \ « h I c 1 i :i i I c ] i I d e d a i i. < •'»i i s 
benefits received by way of Codale Electric Supply, Inc. These 
fact -. . Lndings were not challenged by Mrs, HoLt, "The Court 
ordered Mr. Hoi t to pay ch i 1 d suppor t: < e a v Mr s Hoi t 
with a net monthly shortfall at most $3,263, which amount does not 
take i nt :  > consideration the fact that she is supporting three 
people, not five. The Court further found that the cash payments 
to be made to Mrs. Holt to purchase her interest in Codale could 
return and income, on a tax free basis, of six percent (6%). The 
first payment of $500,000 was to be received within 60 days after 
the entry of the final order. Even assuming a deduction from the 
half million dollar payment of twenty-eight percent (28%) to pay 
her capital gains liability, she would be left with a net payment 
in the first year of $337,762. As demonstrated by the Plaintiff's 
exhibit number P-6 submitted to the Court in the November, 1994 
hearing, by the end of 1996 Mrs. Holt would have tax free interest 
income and tax free child support totalling over $4,100 per month. 
Clearly, if one were to calculate even a twenty percent (20%) 
reduction in the cost of maintaining the standard of living 
attributable to the absence of Mr. Holt and his teenage son from 
the family (an assumption that is, on its face, extremely 
conservative), the award of $2,000 per month permanent alimony far 
exceeds the actual needs of Mrs. Holt. The trial court's award, 
when judged in the light of the Court's own unchallenged findings, 
was clearly erroneous, and should be set aside. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Mrs. Holt fails to marshall the evidence submitted 
by Mr. Holt at trial and is therefore precluded from challenging 
the Findings of Fact. 
10 
2. The Trial Court heard extensive testimony from Dale 
Holt's expert, David Dorton and Mrs. Holt's expert, Paul Shields, 
regarding valuation of the 97.6% stock ownership of Codale. Mr. 
Holt testified that Codale has no employment or non-compete 
agreement with him, leaving him free to initiate a competing 
business, and further, that the customers of Codale are loyal to 
him and a product of his hard work and personal service. The Court 
accepted the valuation of Mr. Holt's expert of $2.8 for the Codale 
stock, finding that Codale had no "good will". The Court fairly 
and equitably divided the marital assets by giving fifty percent 
(50%) of all assets to each party, and requiring Codale to redeem 
Mrs. Holt's shares of stock by paying her $1,344,509 in three 
installments over a two year period, incurring interest at the rate 
of four percent (4%) per annum. The Court's factual findings are 
well supported by the trial record and its division of marital 
assets is fair and equitable to the parties. Mrs. Holt's appeal 
simple re-argues factual issues decided by the trial court. 
3. After taking into consideration the significant cash 
and property awards to Mrs. Holt, the Court awarded Mrs. Holt 
$2,000 per month alimony based upon Mr. Holt's historical income 
over a five year period of $80,000 per year. Mr. Holt's income was 
determined from the parties' tax return and testimony offered by 
Mr. Holt regarding the 1991 and 1992 contributions to Holt 
11 
Properties Partnership which was effectively divided fifty percent 
(50%) each to Mr. and Mrs. Holt. The Court entered Findings of 
Fact showing it made consideration of all required factors 
regarding alimony. With $2,000 per month alimony, $938 child 
support, and tax free income from the cash received through 
redemption of the Codale stock, Mrs. Holt will receive monthly 
income substantially in excess of the monthly expenses of the 
entire family during the marriage found by the Court to be between 
$3,800 to $4,200 per month. 
4. The Court found no economic need for Mrs. Holt to be 
awarded attorney's fees in light of the substantial property award 
and alimony award. 
ARGUMENT OF APPELLEE 
Mrs. Holt appeals virtually every ruling by the trial 
court in a shotgun approach that immediately raises the specter of 
frivolity and lack of merit. Mrs. Holt generally re-argues her 
entire case and simply requests the Court of Appeals to substitute 
their judgment for that of the trial court on all factual issues. 
In fact, a very significant portion of Mrs. Holt's Brief relies on 
evidence which cannot be considered by the Court of Appeals in that 
the evidence was not submitted at trial but in support of Mrs. 
Holt's post-trial Rule 59 Motion, which was denied. Mr. Holt has 
moved to strike those portions of Mrs. Holt's Brief which refer to 
or rely upon post-trial evidence, a copy of which is attached as 
12 
Exhibit 10 and is reiterated and incorporated by reference. Mrs. 
Holt fails to marshall the evidence in support of her position that 
the Findings of Fact should be set aside and the myriad of cases 
submitted often support Mr. Holt's position. This Brief shall show 
that Mrs. Holt's Appeal is totally lacking in merit. 
I. 
Mrs. Holt Fails to Marshall the Evidence 
Section 12 of Mrs. Holt's Brief, pages 20-24, entitled 
"Marshalling of Evidence," fails to examine evidence presented at 
trial by Mr. Holt in support of his legal positions and further 
fails to demonstrate the trial Court's error. As stated in 
Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 432 (Utah App. 1994), this 
Court Held: 
To successfully challenge these findings, 
plaintiff "must marshall the evidence in 
support of the findings and then demonstrate 
that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be 
sagainst the clear weight of the evidence,' 
thus making them Nclearly erroneous.'" In re 
Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 
1989) (quoting State v. State, 743 P.2d 191, 
193 (Utah 1987)). "If the appellant fails to 
marshall the evidence, the appellate court 
assumes that the record supports the findings 
of the trial court and proceeds to a review of 
the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions 
of law and the application of that law in the 
case". Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 
(Utah 1991). Plaintiff has not properly 
challenged the findings in the instant case. 
We therefore assume that the record support 
the trial court's findings .... 
13 
II. 
The Property Distribution is Consistent 
With Principals of Otah Law 
After assigning values to individual assets, including 
valuing Codale Electric Supply Inc. stock at $2,732,000 (Finding 
15, Ex. 5; R. 360) the Court awarded Dale Holt and Vickie Holt 
fifty percent (50%) each of the marital assets as follows (Finding 
18, Ex. 5; R. 361): 
To the Defendant: 
Personal Residence $ 153,000 
IRA Account $ 20,323 
401(k) Retirement Account $ 89,789 
Retirement Plan $ 133,109 
By-out of Codale Shares 
to equalize assets $1.344,509 
Total: $1,740,639 
To the Plaintiff: 
Codale Electric Supply Stock 100% of the Stock 
owned by the parties 
Holt Properties Partnership $ 360,488 
Note: Payable $ 16,000 
Total: $1,740,639 
Mr. Holt owned 97.6 percent interest in Codale which 
leases a building and real property from Holt Properties 
Partnership. Mrs. Holt appeals the valuation of Codale stock by 
the trial court despite the valuation being within the range of 
value testified to by the experts. Mrs. Holt appeals the pay-out 
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Order because of the resulting tax consequences, requiring Codale 
to purchase the stock from Mrs. Holt. The clear reality is that 
the Court's property distribution treats the parties equally and 
fairly and equitably divides the marital estate. 
1. Standards of Utah Law. The general guidelines 
a trial court must follow in property distribution are well stated 
in Newmeyer v. Newmever, 745 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1987): 
In making such order, the trial court is 
permitted broad latitude, and its judgment is 
not to be lightly disturbed, so long as it 
exercises its discretion in accordance with 
the standards set by this court. Jones v. 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1975); see 
Pusev v. Pusev, 728 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah 1986). 
It is therefore incumbent on the appealing 
party to prove that the trial court's division 
violates those standards, (See, e.g. Jones. 
700 P.2d at 1074) or that the trial court's 
Factual Findings upon which the division is 
grounded are clearly erroneous under Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a). 
In Berrv v. Berry, 635 P.2d 68 (Utah 1981) the Utah 
Supreme Court further set forth principals: 
There is no fixed formula which a trial judge 
must follow in making a division of 
properties. Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994 (Utah 
1975). It is the prerogative of the court to 
make whatever disposition of property it deems 
fair, equitable and necessary for the 
protection and welfare of the parties. 
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 562 P.2d 235 (Utah 
1977). This division will not be disturbed on 
appeal unless the record shows that there has 
been an abuse of discretion. Jesperson v. 
Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980). 
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2. The Trial Court's Valuation of Codale Stock is 
Within the Range Established by Expert Testimony « This court has 
established clear guidelines for trial court valuation of marital 
assets. In Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 408 (Utah App. 1989), this 
court stated: 
This court's valuation of stock is a factual 
determination. See Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 
468, 471 (Utah 1984). Accordingly we review 
the court's findings regarding the valuation 
of stock under the "clearly erroneous" 
standard of Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Under this standard of 
review, Findings of Fact will be set aside 
only if they are "against the clear weight of 
evidence, or if the Appellant court otherwise 
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made." State v. Walker. 743 
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). Weston at p. 410. 
Citing the Supreme Court decision of Newmeyer v. 
Newmeyer, supra, the Weston Court stated: 
"When acting as a trier of fact, the trial 
judge is entitled to give conflicting opinions 
whatever weight she deems appropriate". 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer at 1278; Weston v. Weston 
at 410. So long as the value is within the 
ranges established by expert testimony, the 
appeals court will not overturn the trial 
court's valuation of assets. Weston v. Weston 
at 410; Newmeyer v. Newmeyer at 1278; see 
Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 564 (Utah App. 
1993) Argyle v. Argyle at 471. 
The trial court determined that the 97.6 % of Codale 
stock acquired by Dale Holt during the course of the marriage 
should be valued at $2,732,000. (Finding 15, Ex. 5; R 371). 
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Codale maintains no employment or non-compete agreement with Dale 
Holt and as a result Mr. Holt could cease providing services to 
Codale at any time or start a competing business. In un rebutted 
testimony, Mr. Holt testified that the customers of Codale are 
loyal to him and are comprised of individuals he has attracted 
through years of hard work and personal service. It is his opinion 
that if he chose to open a competing business to Codale, the 
customers would follow him. As a result, David Dorton, Mr. Holt's 
expert testified that the total value of Codale is $2.8 million, 
the liquidation value of the assets. Mr. Dorton further testified 
that the business did not have "good will" since the customer base 
was contingent on Mr. Holt's being employed by Codale. Vickie 
Holt's expert, Paul Shields, testified that the business is valued 
at $5.4, including good will, but admitted on cross examination 
that the value of Codale would be significantly less if Mr. Holt 
ceased to an active participant in Codale but would not arrive at 
a valuation figure. Mr. Shields agreed the book value of the 
company was $3.3 million. The trial court agreed with Dale Holt's 
expert in the valuation. 
Vickie Holt's disputing the trial court's ruling on 
valuation is nothing more than a request that the Court of Appeal 
re-determine a factual issue heard by the trial court. The Utah 
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Supreme Court aptly addressed a similar argument in Newmeyer v. 
Newmeyer, at 1278, stating: 
This argument like the one that proceeds it is 
nothing but an attempt to have this Court 
substitute its judgment for the of the trial 
court on a contested factual issue. This we 
cannot do under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 52(a) •.. 
It is elementary that a judge is not bound to 
believe one witness's testimony to the total 
exclusion of that of another witness. When 
acting as a trier of fact, the trial judge is 
entitled to give conflicting opinions whatever 
weight he or she deems appropriate, 
(citations omitted). 
3. Codale has No "Good Will" Associated with the 
Business. This court will uphold as is a trial court's 
determination that an on-going business concern does not have good 
will where the trial court's determination is based on the evidence 
proffered. In Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1988), 
the trial court determined that the Defendant husband's hay-hauling 
business did not have good will consistent with the husband's 
expert valuation. Mrs. Stevens appealed. In the process of 
upholding the trial court's ruling, the Court of Appeals defined 
good will as follows: 
Good will is the advantage or benefit which is 
acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere 
value of the capital, stocks, funds or 
property employed therein, in consequence of 
the general patronage and encouragement which 
it receives from constant or habitual 
customers on account of its location or local 
position or reputation for quality, skill, 
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integrity or punctuality. It is something in 
business which gives reasonable expectancy of 
preference in the race of competition. 
Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 85; 415 
P.2d 667, 670 (Utah 1966); see also 38 C.J.S. 
Goodwill, section 1 (1943) ... 
Where appropriate, the good will value of a 
business enterprise is subject to equitable 
distribution. Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 
1076, 1080 n.l (Utah 1988). There can be no 
good will in a business that is dependant for 
its existence upon the individual who conducts 
the enterprise and would vanish were the 
individual to die, retire or quit work. 
Jackson, 18 Utah 2d at 86, 415 P.2d at 670. 
Stevens v. Stevens, at 956. 
The record supports the trial court agreeing with Dale 
Holt's expert that Codale has no good will. See Finding 15, Ex. 5; 
R. 360. Codale has no long term employment or non-compete 
agreement with Mr. Holt and Mr. Holt testified that the customer 
base of Codale is loyal to him and based upon his hard work and 
personals service. If Mr. Holt were to leave, the customers would 
follow him. 
The trial court appropriately determined Codale has no 
good will to distribute as a marital asset consistent with the 
principal stated in Stevens. Accord Sorenson v. Sorenson, 839 P.2d 
774 (Utah 1992). 
4. The Pay Out Ordered on Assets is Consistent 
With Utah Law. In Weston v. Weston, at 410, this Court stated: 
In dividing the martial estate, the trial 
court can enter such orders concerning 
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property distribution and alimony as are 
equitable. Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5 
(1987). "In making such orders, the trial 
court is permitted broad latitude, and its 
judgment is not to be lightly disturbed, so 
long as it exercised its discretion in 
accordance with the standards set by this 
court." Newmever, 745 P.2d at 1277; see also 
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
In exercising its broad discretion, the trial 
court may fashion a variety of methods for 
dividing assets. See Naranio v. Naranio, 751 
P.2d 1144, 1147-48 (Utah 1988) There is no 
fixed formula for the division of marital 
property. Berry v. Berry, 635 P.2d 68, 69 
(Utah 1981). Further, M[i]t is the court's 
duty to make a division of the property and 
income in a divorce procedure so that the 
parties may readjust their lives to the new 
situation as well as possible. 
The principal of disentangling the marital relationship 
with respect to joint stock ownership in a closely held corporation 
was set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Argyle v. Argyle, at 471 
when it reiterated an oft-quoted principal: 
Wherever possible, this Court avoids division 
of marital stock between the parties because 
it forces them to be in a "close economic 
relationship which has every potential for 
further contention, friction and litigation, 
especially when third parties having nothing 
to do with the divorce will also necessarily 
be involved", citing Savage v. Savage, 658 
P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah 1983). 
The trial court awarded Mrs. Holt fifty percent (50%) of 
the parties stock acquired during the course of marriage which was 
valued at $1,344,509 and required Codale to redeem the stock or 
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Dale Holt to purchase the stock with an initial payment of $500,000 
sixty days from the entry of the Decree, payment of an additional 
$422,254 within one year of the first payment and the final 
$422,254 within two years of the initial payment which would bear 
interest at the rate of four percent (4%) per annum. (Order, para. 
17, Ex. 6; R. 395.) Dale Holt and Vickie Holt were each required 
to pay any tax liability associated with the sale of the stock. 
(Order, para. 18, Ex. 6; R. 378-79). The court further ordered the 
parties to submit a plan to acquire the Defendant's one-half 
interest in the shares to minimize the tax consequences as much as 
possible to the Defendant (Order, para 14, Ex. 6; R. 376-77). 
However, Mrs. Holt did not submit an alternative plan post-trial 
and the trial court accepted the proposal submitted by Dale Holt 
(Order on Post-Trial Motions, para 4 and 5, January 20, 1995, Ex. 
7; R. 387) . 
In Weston v. Weston, at 411, the court examined the 
awarding and dividing of stocks in a closely held corporation, 
stating: 
Marital assets consisting of stock in a 
closely held family corporation can be 
distributed in divorce proceedings by several 
alternate means, including division of the 
stock, awarding off-setting property, or cash 
payments over time. Citing Lee v* Lee, 744 
P.2d 1378, 1380-81 (Utah App. 1987). 
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The trial court's awarding Mrs. Holt of fifty percent 
(50%) of the Codale stock and requiring purchase over time is 
consistent with principals established by this court. Likewise, 
requiring Mrs. Holt to pay the tax consequences of the distribution 
is fair and equitable. Mr. Holt, in the event he sells his stock, 
will also be liable for tax consequences of the sale of his stock 
and it would be unfair to require him to also bear the burden of 
paying the taxes on the corporation purchasing her stock. In Mrs. 
Holt's Brief, she repeatedly complains that she has not received 
"income producing asset". She in fact is receiving $1,344,509 cash 
from sale of the stock and it is difficult to understand why she 
complains so loudly. 
Mrs. Holt further complains that requiring Codale to only 
pay four percent (4%) interest on the payments due over a two year 
period is a "abuse of discretion". However, the trial court has 
the latitude to make appropriate adjustments in the relationships 
of the parties and make such orders as are fair and equitable given 
the overall distribution plan ordered by the court. The trial 
court may award no interest or interest as is appropriate under the 
circumstances. (Weston v. Weston, supra; no interest for first four 
years, then interest over fifteen years) 
5. Award of Codale Automobiles. Mrs. Hold was awarded 
a 1988 Ford Bronco valued at $8,775 and a 1987 BMW automobile 
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valued at $19,250, both of which were owned by Codale. (Finding 
19, Ex. 5; R. 374). She was required by the trial court to pay 
Codale for both of these automobiles, since she received fifty 
percent (50%) of the value of the corporation and the automobiles 
were carried on the records of the corporation. Requiring Mrs. 
Holt to pay for the automobiles under the circumstances where she 
is receiving fifty percent (50%) of the value of the corporation is 
consistent with an equitable distribution of marital assets between 
the parties where each party. 
6. Claim of Omitted Assets is Spurious. Vickie Holt 
claims that the Oakridge Country Club membership and a condominium 
owned by Codale were omitted from valuation of the assets. 
However, the court received testimony on the Oakridge Country Club 
membership during trial (T. 596) and it was addressed in the court 
findings (Finding 13). Further, in the event that Mrs. Holt's 
expert did fail to identify and address the Oakridge Country Club 
membership during trial, she cannot now be heard to complain for 
the first time on appeal. Regarding the condominium, Dale Holt 
purchased the condominium as a residence after conclusion of the 
trial since he needed a place to live. The marital estate is 
valued at the time of trial. Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697 
(Utah 1985). The court cannot continually re-evaluate the marital 
estate for months after the divorce trial unless the claim of fraud 
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or concealment from the trial court is alleged. No such 
allegations can be made against Dale Holt since the condo was not 
purchased until after the trial. 
7. Mr. Holt's Expert Valued "Intangible Assets" at 
Zero. The trial court accepted David Dorton's liquidation value 
for Codale, under which "Intangible Assets" were assigned no value. 
(Exhibit P-21, p. 56). By asserting that this Court should award 
her an additional $173,600 as one-half the value of the intangible 
assets of Codale, Mrs. Holt is requesting this Court to substitute 
its judgment on a factual issue for that of the trial court. 
8. The Trial Court Made a Fair and Equitable Division 
of the Marital Estate. Consistent with sound principals of Utah 
case law, the trial court made a fair and equitable distribution of 
the marital assets between Dale Holt and Vickie Holt. The division 
of the marital property awards each party one-half of the marital 
estate. The trial court award of assets accomplished the goal of 
re-adjusting lives to a new situation as well as possible. Arqyle 
v. Arqyle. at 471. 
III. 
THB ALIMONY AWARD ENABLES MRS. HOLT TO MAINTAIN 
THE STANDARD OF LIVING DURING THE MARRIAGE 
The trial court award of alimony enables Mrs. Holt to 
maintain, and within two years, significantly exceed the standard 
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of living to which she was accustomed during her marriage to Dale 
Holt. The trial court found that the parties had been married 
twenty-three years and that Vickie Holt had contributed to the 
business though she is not employed outside the house. (Finding 
23, Ex. 5; R. 363). The monthly living expenses for the entire 
family during the marriage were found to be between $3,800 and 
$4,200 per month, though Mrs. Holt had for several months lived on 
temporary support of $1,538 per month without incurring any 
additional debt. (Finding 24, Ex. 5; R. 464). Based upon Mr. 
Holt's testimony and the parties' income tax returns, the court 
found over a five year period a historical gross annual income of 
$80,000 for Mr. Holt. (Finding 7, Ex. 5; R. 356-57). The court 
found that the $1,344,509 awarded to Mrs. Holt can earn tax free 
income of six percent (6%) per year. (Finding 25, Ex. 5; R. 364). 
The Court awarded Mrs. Holt alimony of $2,000 per month terminable 
upon death, remarriage or co-habitation. (Finding 26, Ex. 5; R. 
364) . 
1. Requirements of Utah Law in Awarding Alimony. The 
general purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving spouse from 
becoming a public charge and to maintain to the extent possible the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Howell v. Howell, 
806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah App. 1991) cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 
(Utah 1991). In determining whether to award alimony and setting 
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the amount the trial court must consider (1) the financial 
conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of 
the receiving spouse to provide for him or herself; and (3) the 
ability of the payor spouse to provide support. English v. 
English, 564 P.2d 409, 411-12 (Utah 1977); Chambers v. Chambers, 
840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah App. 1992). Where a trial court has 
considered these three factors and has supported its rulings with 
adequate findings based upon sufficient evidence, the Court of 
Appeals will not disturb the trial court's determination unless it 
has clearly abused its discretion. Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 
550 (Utah App. 1993); Chambers, supra at 843. 
A. Vickie Holt's Financial Condition and Need. The 
trial court found that Mrs. Holt stayed at home raising the 
parties' children and imputed no income to her. The trial court 
found that the living expenses submitted at trial were "excessive" 
but determined that the household living expenses during the 
marriage were between $3,800 and $4,200 per month. The trial court 
further found that Mrs. Holt and the parties children lived on 
$1,538 per month temporary support and incurred no debt during that 
period. There is no further finding by the trial court on need of 
Vickie Holt to receive alimony. 
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B. Ability of Mr. Holt to Provide for Himself. Mr. 
Holt received $80,000 per year income from the corporation which is 
adequate to meet his expenses. 
C. Ability of Mr. Holt to Provide Support. The trial 
court found that Mr. Holt's historical income during the five year 
period prior to trial was $80,000 per year. Regarding Dale Holt's 
income, Vickie Holt intentionally attempts to mislead this court in 
her Brief at page 24 by failing to disclose the evidence submitted 
at trial regarding Mr. Holt's income and, again re-arguing her case 
for a different factual determination by this court. Mrs. Holt 
asserts that Dale Holt's tax returns disclose income in 1990 of 
$340,239, for 1991, $309,347, for 1992, $83,672 and for 1993, 
$158,653 which including Schedule K-l income from Holt Properties 
Partnership. Mrs. Holt fails to note that in 1990 and 1991, a 
total of approximately $465,000 was taken as income in order to 
purchase the ground for the building in which Codale leases space 
and to pay for improvements to the building through Holt Properties 
Partnership, His income in 1990 and 1991, after those 
contributions was less than $80,000 per year, which included fringe 
benefits. His salary was $65,000 per year, and his testimony was 
unrefuted that he paid $2400 per month to Mrs. Holt to run the 
household. (T. 130-32). Further, in 1992, the $63,500 "income" 
from Holt Properties Partnership was in fact not distributable 
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income but paper income since the money was put back into the 
building through Holt Properties Partnership, Mrs. Holt received 
fifty percent (50%) of the value of Holt Properties Partnership, 
which had a total value of $360,000. Further, Mr. Holt testified 
that his income for 1994 at the time of trial was consistent with 
his prior years' income of $80,000. 
D. The Alimony and Child Support Exceed the Family 
Living Expenses. Vickie Holt, during the first sixty days after 
entry of the Decree, received the following monthly income: 
$2,000 Alimony 
$ 975 Child Support 
$2,500 Tax Free Income (6% of $500,000) 
$5,475 TOTAL 
One year and two months after the Decree, Mrs. Holt is 
scheduled to receive $422,000 plus $16,880 interest or $438,880 
which at the rate of six percent (6%) interest per year means she 
will receive an additional $2,194 per year towards her income. One 
year later, she will receive an additional distribution of $438,000 
which will earn her an additional $2,194 per month. At the end of 
the two year and two month period, Mrs. Holt's tax free income 
would be $T,763 (including child support) plus taxable alimony of 
$2,000 per month. This amount far exceeds the monthly living 
expense of the family found by the court to be $3,800 to $4,200 per 
month. Where the trial court has addressed each of the required 
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factors found in English v. English, and the award of alimony, 
child support and income producing property clearly exceeds the 
monthly needs, this court should uphold the trial court's findings, 
conclusions and award of alimony. 
2. Dale Holt's Income. Mrs. Holt intends to exploit 
the fact that Dale Holt owns 97.6% of Codale, urging the court to 
reverse the trial court's decision on alimony. However, Dale 
Holt's income is only one factor to be considered by the court and 
only becomes an issue if the trial has not explored and considered 
the three factors for determining an appropriate alimony award. 
Morgan at 567-69; Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262, 1267-68 (Utah App. 
1994) . Here, the trial heard significant testimony on the business 
of Codale, its expenses and income and determined that Dale Holt's 
income is $80,000 on a historical basis, consistent with principals 
of Utah law. Cox v. Cox at 1267. The needs of Mrs. Holt and her 
standard of living are clearly met and exceeded by the income she 
will receive from sale of the stock and the alimony. Vickie Holt 
is simply asserting she wants more money to live on then is 
reasonably necessary to meet her needs. As found by the trial 
court, the expenses to which Mrs. Holt testified she incurred "seem 
excessive" (Finding 24; Ex. 5; R. 364). The Court of Appeals will 
not second guess the factual determinations of the trial court 
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where it is apparent from the record that the trial court has 
appropriately considered all pertinent factors. 
The issue of "underemployment" was not raised at trial 
and cannot now be considered by the Court of Appeals for the first 
time on appeal. Alford v. Utah League of Cities and Towns. 791 
P.2d 201 (Utah App. 1990). 
However/ as stated in Cox v. Cox at 1267: 
Imputing income to an unemployed or 
underemployed spouse when setting an alimony 
is conceptually appropriate as part of the 
determination of that spouse's ability to 
produce a sufficient income. Willey v. 
Willev, 866 P.2d 547, 544 (Utah App. 1993). 
However, a court should not impute income for 
child or spousal support until it first 
determines, "as a threshold matter, that 
income should be imputed because the (spouse) 
is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed." 
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018,. 1024 (Utah App. 
1993). Also see Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5, 
Ex. 3. 
The trial court made no such threshold determination 
regarding Dale Holt. Mrs. Holt again requests this Court to 
substitute its judgment for the trial court's judgment on a factual 
determination. 
Another legally insufficient position taken by Mrs. Holt 
in her Brief (p. 5, para. 6 and fn 22 and 23; p. 37, subpara. b; p. 
44, para. 18) is stating that the court should retroactively apply 
§ 30-3-5 (7)-(9), effective May 1, 1995 to the trial court's 
determination of alimony. Mrs. Holt fails to establish any legal 
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basis for retroactive application of the statute. First, Utah Code 
Annotated § 68-3-3 provides that "(n)o part of these revised 
statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared". Generally, 
Utah Courts will not retroactively apply a statute unless the 
legislature declares its intent for that purpose. See Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 1988). Second, and more 
importantly, the application of the amended statute could not have 
been raised at trial and therefore is raised on appeal for the 
first time, which under settled principals of Utah law will not be 
considered by the Court of Appeal. 
3. The Alimony Award Provides the Standard of Living to 
Which Vickie Holt was Accustomed During Marriage. The trial court 
considered all three indicia required under English v. English when 
awarding Mrs. Holt alimony. Additionally, the award of alimony was 
part the overall plan established by the court to allow the parties 
to go on with their lives. The trial court's award of alimony 
should be upheld as consistent with the record, the income and 
assets of the parties and Utah case law. 
4« Awarding Dale Holt the Tax Exemptions is Fair and 
Appropriate* The court found good cause for awarding Dale Holt the 
income tax exemptions for the minor children (Finding 8, Ex. 5; R. 
361). As stated by the trial court, "The justification for this 
finding includes, but is not limited to, the fact that the 
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Plaintiff has a higher income, provides the majority of support of 
the children and can derive greater tax advantage from the use of 
the exemptions." The basis upon which Mrs. Holt asserts that she 
should receive the income tax exemption or some "compensating 
award" is that she projects at some point in the future Mr. Holt 
will receive little or no tax benefit from the exemption because 
his salary will increase (Appellant's Brief, page 46, para. 22). 
This court has previously held that a trial court does err in 
refusing to adjust property distributions because of theoretical 
tax consequences. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1213-14 (Utah 
App. 1991) . While the specific facts of the Howell case dealt with 
application of tax consequences, the general proposition that a 
court does not err in dealing with speculative facts applies to the 
proposition stated by Mrs. Holt regarding a speculative increase of 
salary for Mr. Holt. 
5. Award of Indefinite Alimony is Appropriate. Mrs. 
Holt takes the position that the court should have awarded 
permanent non-terminable alimony. Mrs. Holt again urges 
inappropriate application of § 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended 1995r to the facts produced at trial in June, 1994. The 
change in the statute affects a substantive right and therefore 
should not be applied. Further, this position is raised for the 
first time on appeal. 
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Additionally, the finding of the trial court that Codale 
possesses no good will because much of the business is the 
responsibility of Dale Holt is tantamount to stating that Dale Holt 
has a professional degree which cannot be shared by a spouse. 
Under those circumstances, Utah courts have universally held that 
permanent alimony is inappropriate based on "an intangible right 
which, because of its character, cannot properly be characterized 
as property subject to division between spouses." Peterson v. 
Peterson, 737 P.2d 237, 241 (Utah App. 1987) . See also Martinez v. 
Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991) (overturned award of equitable 
restitution based on medical decree); Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 
1076, 1081 (Utah 1988) (benefit of wife's investment in husband was 
adequately reflected in a greater property settlement and higher 
alimony); Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987) 
(disparity in income due to license is adequately addressed under 
traditional alimony analysis). 
IV. 
MRS, HOLT FAILED TO ESTABLISH A NEED FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
§30-3-3 Utah Code Annotated (1993) provides that the 
trial court has discretion to award attorney's fees. However, the 
decision to award attorney's fees in divorce cases must be based on 
evidence of both financial need and reasonableness. Rasband v. 
Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988); Anderson v. Anderson, 757 
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P.2d 476 (Utah App. 1988); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah 
App. 1990). The trial court specifically found that Mrs. Holt 
could not establish a need for an award of attorney's fees based 
upon assets distributed from the marital estate. (Finding 27, Ex. 
5; R. 364). 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Holt has primarily re-argued the facts of her case 
to this Court, requesting that this Court redetermine all of the 
factual issues previously ruled upon by the trial court. Mrs. Holt 
failed her burden to marshall the evidence when attacking the trial 
court's Findings of Fact. Mrs. Holt attempted to employ as a basis 
for her positions evidence which cannot be considered on Appeal for 
a significant portion of her Brief. Mrs. Holt failed to 
demonstrate how the trial court deviated from established precedent 
in any respect, when ruling on the. issues of division of martial 
estate, alimony and child support. 
The trial court's Findings of fact, Conclusions of Law, 
Order and Judgment are consistent with Utah statutes and common law 
and should be upheld by this Court in all respects. 
DATED this 3\ day of May, 1996. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
fi\ 
By: ANN L. WASSERMANN, Esq. 
E. PAUL WOOD, Esq. 
Attorneys for Dale Holt 
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30-3-2 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
justifying divorce, 82 A.L.R.3d 725. 
Contract between husband or wife and third 
person promotive of divorce or separation, what 
constitutes, 93 A.L.R.3d 523. 
"Incompatibility" within statute specifying it 
as substantive ground for divorce, what consti-
tutes, 97 A.L.R.3d 989. 
Modern status of views as to validity of 
premarital agreements contemplating divorce 
or separation, 53 A.L.R.4th 22. 
Enforceability of premarital agreements gov-
erning support or property rights upon divorce 
or separation as affected by circumstances sur-
rounding execution — modern status, 53 
A.L.R.4th 85. 
Enforceability of premarital agreements gov-
erning support or property rights upon divorce 
or separation as affected by fairness or ade-
quacy of those terms — modern status, 53 
A.L.R.4th 161. 
Right to jury trial in state court divorce 
proceedings, 56 A.L.R.4th 955. 
Lis pendens as applicable to suit for separa-
tion or dissolution of marriage, 65 A.L.R 4th 
522. 
Insanity as defense to divorce or separation 
suit — post-1950 cases, 67 A.L.R.4th 277. 
Divorce and separation: effect of court order 
prohibiting sale or transfer of property on 
party's right to change beneficiary of insurance 
policy, 68 A.L.R.4th 929. 
Joinder of tort action between spouses with 
proceeding for dissolution of marriage, 4 
A.L.R.5th 972. 
Pre-emptive effect of Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) provisions (29 
USC §§ 1056(d)(3), 1144(a), 1144(b)(7)) with 
respect to orders entered in domestic relations 
proceedings, 116 A.L.R. Fed. 503. 
Key Numbers. — Divorce «=> 12-38, 57-65. 
30-3-2. Right of husband to divorce. 
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from his wife for the same 
causes and in the same manner as the wife may obtain a divorce from her 
husband. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1209; 
C.L. 1917, § 2997; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 40-
3-2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Both parties at fault. 
Cruel treatment. 
Both parties a t fault. 
Marriage may be dissolved by making a 
grant of divorce to each party where each was 
equally at fault. Mullins v. Mullins, 26 Utah 2d 
82, 485 R2d 663 (1971). 
Crue l t r e a t m e n t . 
Acts constituting cruel conduct sufficient to 
cause great mental distress need not be aggra-
vated and more severe when directed toward 
the husband than when directed toward the 
wife. Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utah 
1975). 
30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees — Tem-
porary alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action 
to establish an order of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or division 
of property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, 
attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other 
party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order 
may include provision for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, child support, 
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs 
and attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed 
upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or 
limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or enters 
in the record the reason for not awarding fees. 
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(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to 
provide money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and 
maintenance of the other party and of any children in the custody of the other 
party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or 
judgment may be amended during the course of the action or in the final order 
or judgment. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-3, enacted by L. 
1993, ch. 137, § 1. 
Repeals and Reenactments . — Laws 
1993, ch. 72, § 10 repeals former § 30-3-3, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, allowing a court to 
ANALYSIS 
Appeal from order. 
Attorney fees. 
—Appeal. 
—Award to attorney not permitted. 
—Contesting petition for modification. 
—Need. 
—Reasonable. 
Attorney's lien on alimony. 
Contempt proceedings. 
Costs and expenses on appeal. 
Discretion of trial court. 
Enforcement of order or decree. 
Jurisdiction. 
Mandamus. 
Order of court. 
Stipulation and effect thereof. 
Temporary alimony. 
Cited. 
Appeal from order. 
Where there were no findings or evidence in 
record as to attorney's fees, Supreme Court 
remanded issue for disposition by trial court 
but allowed wife's attorney $100 for services 
rendered with reference to husband's appeal 
from judgment modifying divorce decree. Par-
ish v. Parish, 84 Utah 390, 35 P.2d 999 (1934). 
Supreme Court assumed that evidence sup-
ported award of suit money to wife where no 
testimony as to wife's need was before the court 
on appeal on judgment roll from the decree of 
no cause of action in husband and awarding of 
expenses of suit, attorney's fees and temporary 
alimony to wife. Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 
179 P.2d 1005 (1947). 
Court should have made findings regarding 
need for reimbursement and ability to pay 
when one party sought reimbursement of ac-
counting costs that had been incurred in pros-
ecuting the action. Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 
P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Attorney fees. 
Where decree of divorce was obtained by 
order either party to pay for the separate sup-
port and maintenance of the adverse party and 
the children, and enacts the present section, 
effective May 3, 1993. 
mother of minor children against father, who 
was required to pay certain sum periodically for 
support, care, maintenance, and education of 
such children, and he, without sufficient cause, 
refused to comply with decree, as result of 
which mother was compelled to bring proceed-
ings against him, father was required to pay 
counsel fees in such proceedings. Tribe v. Tribe, 
59 Utah 112, 202 P. 213 (1921). 
Court properly awarded attorney's fees to 
wife in subsequent proceeding on application of 
wife for arrears in alimony. Christensen v. 
Christensen, 65 Utah 597, 239 P. 501 (1925). 
While fact that wife is able to pay expenses of 
defending husband's divorce suit or to obtain 
credit therefor should be considered by court in 
determining whether to make award for ex-
penses of suit and amount thereof, such fact 
alone does not show that award is unjustified, 
and consequently fact that award to wife for 
expenses of defending suit was made after 
expenses were paid or credit extended therefor 
did not render award erroneous as showing 
that she had no need therefor. Weiss v. Weiss, 
111 Utah 353,179 P.2d 1005 (1947). 
Although there was no detailed presentation 
of facts establishing the usual requisite factors 
to support an award of attorney's fees, trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 
attorney fees to plaintiff to enable her to pros-
ecute an action to enforce a provision of the 
divorce decree where the facts implicit in the 
proceeding and the evidence necessarily pre-
sented to the trial court, together with the de 
minimis nature of the award, constituted a 
sufficient basis to sustain the exercise of trial 
court's discretion. Beardall v. Beardall, 629 P.2d 
425 (Utah 1981). 
Trial court properly denied wife's request for 
attorney fees in divorce proceeding where she 
offered no evidence at trial to show the nature 
or amount of any attorney fees incurred or any 
need for court-ordered assistance in the pay-
ment of such fees. Warren v. Warren, 655 P.2d 
684 (Utah 1982). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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The decision to award attorney fees in di-
vorce proceedings rests primarily in the sound 
discretion of the trial, court. However, the 
award must be based on evidence of both finan-
cial need and reasonableness. Rasband v. 
Rasband, 752 R2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Attorney fees may be awarded in actions for 
the support and maintenance of children, in-
cluding actions for the modification of child 
custody. The decision to award such fees lies 
within the trial court's discretion. Maughan v. 
Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Either party to a divorce action may be or-
dered to pay the adverse party to prosecute or 
defend the action. This includes attorney fees 
incurred on appeal. Maughan v. Maughan, 770 
P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In order to award attorney fees, the trial 
court must find the requesting party in need of 
financial assistance and that the fees requested 
are reasonable. Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 
P.2d 1057 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Haumont v. 
Haumont, 793 R2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
Because the income to wife was uncertain 
and she had no other source of income and 
because husband had received a larger portion 
of the marital estate, husband was to pay wife's 
legal fees. Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 
(Utah 1993). 
—Appeal. 
Ex-husband who unsuccessfully appealed 
trial court's ruling on an alimony reduction 
action was required to pay the appeal costs and 
ex-wife's attorney fees for defending on appeal. 
Carter v. Carter, 584 P.2d 904 (Utah 1978). 
Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce have been 
awarded below to the party who then prevails 
on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that 
party on appeal. Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
When allegations of fact supporting a claim 
of attorney fees on appeal are not a matter of 
record and have not been adjudicated by a 
finder of fact, the appellate court will remand 
the claim for determination of whether the 
party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal, and 
if so, the amount of fees to be awarded. 
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
—Award to attorney not permitted. 
It was error for the district court to amend a 
divorce decree to order the payment of attorney 
fees directly to the wife's attorney. McDonald v. 
McDonald, 866 R2d 1253 (Utah Ct. App 1993). 
—Contesting petition for modification. 
A reasonable attorney's fee may be awarded a 
wife who contests a modification petition where 
the custody of children is involved. Anders.^ ^ 
Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36, 368 P.2d 264 (1962)! 
—Need. 
It was an abuse of discretion for trial court to 
award attorney fees to mother in child custody 
modification proceeding where there was no 
presentation of facts establishing her financial 
need for such an award. Kallas v. Kallas, 614 
P.2d 641 (Utah 1980). 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
ordering each party to pay his or her own 
attorney fees, where neither party reasonably 
had the ability to pay the other party's attorney 
fees. Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah Ct 
App. 1990). 
Wife who did not prevail on any of the issues 
she brought on appeal and did not establish 
financial need on the record was denied attor-
ney fees on appeal. Haumont v. Haumont, 793 
P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
An award of attorney fees must be based on 
evidence of the financial need of the receiving 
spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, 
and the reasonableness of the requested fees. 
Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Since the legislature has not placed a prohi-
when determining whether to award attorney 
fees and costs, a trial court is not precluded as 
a matter of law from considering the income of 
a receiving parent's new spouse when deter-
mining the receiving parent's "need" for costs 
and attorney fees. Crockett v. Crockett, 836 
P.2d 818 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Since the trial court, in awarding attorney 
fees, did not address the reasonableness of the 
fees, and stopped short of finding that each 
party would have the means to pay his own fees 
out of the money being distributed to both, the 
award of attorney fees was an abuse of discre-
tion. Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Because the proffered evidence of the wife's 
attorney's fees was adequate and entirely un-
disputed, the court abused its discretion in 
reducing the requested amount without a find-
ing that the deduction was warranted by one of 
the established factors upon which a court is 
required to base its award. Muir v. Muir, 841 
P.2d 736 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
When an award of attorney fees is based on 
need, the trial court must support the award 
with adequate findings detailing the reason-
ableness of the amount awarded and the need 
of the receiving party. Finlayson v. Finlayson, 
874 R2d 843 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
—Reasonable. 
Allowance of $200 as wife's attorney's fee in 
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divorce proceeding was not inadequate even 
though husband was worth approximately 
$40,000, where proceedings from time of com-
mencement until entry of decree lasted less 
than two months and trial itself was completed 
in less than two days Blair v Blair, 40 Utah 
306,121 P 19, 38 L R A (n s ) 269, 1914D Ann 
Cas 989(1912) 
Fifty dollars was a reasonable fee where wife 
petitioned to require husband to show cause 
why he should not be punished for contempt for 
failure to pay support money and husband filed 
cross-petition for modification of decree and 
where it was shown that wife was without 
means to prosecute the cause or pay counsel 
Scott v Scott, 105 Utah 376, 142 P2d 198 
(1943) 
In divorce cases, an award of attorney's fees 
must be supported by evidence which shows 
that the requested award is reasonable and 
which establishes the financial need of the 
party requesting the award, relevant factors of 
reasonableness include the necessity of the 
number of hours dedicated, the reasonableness 
of the rate charged in light of the difficulty of 
the case and the result accomplished, and the 
rates commonly charged for divorce actions in 
the community Beals v Beals, 682 P2d 862 
(Utah 1984), Newmeyer v Newmeyer, 745 P 2d 
1276 (Utah 1987) 
An award of attorney fees to the wife was 
reasonable where the evidence showed that the 
wife needed assistance, the husband had initi-
ated the divorce proceedings, requiring the wife 
to hire an attorney, the husband was very well 
supported by his family, and the wife had 
worked for only four months before the couple 
separated Walther v Walther 709 P2d 387 
(Utah 1985) 
An award of attorney fees was proper where 
the record showed the wife's need based upon 
the fact that her monthly expenses exceeded 
her monthly income and the attorney testified 
to the reasonableness of his fees Sinclair v 
Sinclair, 718 P2d 396 (Utah 1986) 
Attorney's l ien on alimony. 
Where wife in divorce action agreed to pay 
fee to attorney who was allowed reasonable fee 
payable by husband, and attorney had order 
entered requiring husband to pay alimony to 
clerk of court to be withdrawn by wife or her 
attorney, and attorney in accordance with his 
claim of lien withdrew balance of his fee from 
alimony paid to clerk, court order requiring him 
to return such money was void, since attorney 
had hen on alimony, and wife was liable for his 
fee even in absence of special agreement 
Hampton v Hampton, 85 Utah 338, 39 P2d 703 
(1935) 
Contempt proceedings. 
In contempt proceeding for failure to comply 
with divorce decree, findings that husband had 
not paid realty taxes and had not paid plaintiff 
amount allowed for attorney's fees were insuf-
ficient to support adjudication of contempt, 
since decree said nothing about taxes and pro-
vided for payment of attorney's fees to attorney 
Openshaw v Openshaw, 86 Utah 229, 42 P2d 
191 (1935) 
Costs and expenses on appeal. 
The Supreme Court may determine whether 
additional counsel fees should be allowed, and 
may allow costs of appeal to appellant, such as 
filing fees, printing costs and the like Dahlberg 
v Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 P 214 (1930) 
Upon appeal by defendant husband from 
judgment that he was m arrears of alimony and 
in which he sought modification of decree, wife, 
who was allowed $25 for expense of printing 
brief on appeal, was allowed further sum of 
$100 as costs, including her attorney's fees 
Hendncks v Hendricks 91 Utah 564, 65 P2d 
642 (1937) 
Wife was entitled to allowance for expenses 
incurred on her appeal from judgment granting 
husband divorce, including reasonable attorney 
fees, where wife was not working, had no 
means of her own and had been partially sup-
ported by her parents for number of years 
Peterson v Peterson, 112 Utah 542, 189 P2d 
961 (1948) 
Discretion of trial court. 
Allowance of alimony and expenses of divorce 
trial, including attorneys fees, are largely mat-
ters within discretion of court which tries case 
Burtt v Burtt, 59 Utah 457, 204 P 91 (1922) 
The reasonableness of the amount of the 
attorney's fee is a matter largely within the 
discretion of the trial court Openshaw v 
Openshaw, 80 Utah 9 12 P2d 364 (1932) 
Allowance of temporary alimony and suit 
money is based on necessity of recipient, and 
such allowance as well as amount thereof is 
largely matter within sound discretion of trial 
court Weiss v Weiss 111 Utah 353 179 P2d 
1005 (1947) 
Former section did not contemplate that 
awards for expenses of suit or for temporary 
alimony should be made only in those cases 
where "adverse party usually wife) is desti-
tute or practically so but contemplated such 
awards when, in sound discretion of court, 
circumstances of parties are such that in fair-
ness to wife she should be given financial assis-
tance by her husband in her prosecution or 
defense of divorce action and for her support 
during its pendency Weiss v Weiss 111 Utah 
353 179 P2d 1005(1947; 
Both the decision to a v. ard attorne\ fees and 
the amount of such fee* are within the sound 
discretion of the trial court Crouse \ Crouse, 
817 P2d 836 (Utah Ct App 1991) 
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Court should use its sound discretion in de-
termining whether to award costs based on 
need and ability to pay * Peterson v Peterson, 
818 P2d 1305 (Utah Ct App 1991) 
It is within court's discretion to define costs 
as those reasonable amounts that are reason-
ably expended to prosecute or defend a divorce 
action Peterson v Peterson, 818 P2d 1305 
(Utah Ct App 1991) 
Trial court was within its discretion in con-
cluding that the costs of the action included a 
custody evaluation, polygraph examination, ex-
pert witness fees, service fees, and copying 
charges Peterson v Peterson, 818 P2d 1305 
(Utah Ct App 1991) 
Because court's findings failed to demon-
strate that an award was arrived at after 
proper consideration of the relevant factors for 
determining the reasonableness of attorney fee 
awards, the award was an abuse of discretion 
Rappleye v Rappleye, 855 P2d 260 (Utah Ct 
App 1993) 
Enforcement of order or decree. 
Enforcement, by citation or an order to show 
cause or by contempt proceedings, of orders or 
decrees with respect to payment of monthly or 
other specific periods of alimony and counsel 
fees, for a failure and willful refusal to pay 
same, is one of the inherent equity powers of 
the court Herzog v Bramel, 82 Utah 216, 23 
P2d 345 (1933) 
Jurisdict ion. 
Fact that district court had no jurisdiction of 
status of marriage between parties to hus-
band's divorce action, because of noncompli-
ance with residence requirement of § 30-3-1, 
had no effect on and did not preclude award to 
wife for temporary alimony, expenses of suit 
and attorney's fees Weiss v Weiss, 111 Utah 
353, 179 P 2d 1005(1947) 
Mandamus. 
District court had jurisdiction of petition 
seeking enforcement of payment of alimony and 
counsel fees as required by divorce decree and 
court's view that it had no jurisdiction until 
determination of validity of alleged settlement 
was improper, so that mandamus issued to 
compel court to proceed with the cause Herzog 
v Bramel, 82 Utah 216, 23 P2d 345 (1933) 
If order to show cause is improperly refused, 
the judge may be required by peremptory writ 
of mandate to issue such order Mann v 
Morrison, 102 Utah 282, 130 P2d 286 (1942) 
Where defendant wife bnngs a proceeding for 
writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of an 
order to show cause why plaintiff husband 
should not pay temporary alimony, suit money 
and attorney's fees, the Supreme Court may 
make a determination of the sufficiency of the 
allegations to require the order Anderson v 
Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P2d 252 (1943) 
Order of court. 
An order directing payment of attorney's fees 
to plaintiff's attorney is void, because it runs in 
favor of the attorney, who is not a party to the 
action or proceeding Openshaw v Openshaw 
80 Utah 9, 12 P2d 364 (1932) 
Upon a proper application, lower court will 
issue an order as a matter of course to plaintiff 
husband to show cause why he should not pay 
temporary alimony, suit money and attorney 
fees But where motion was denied, Supreme 
Court will not examine affidavits in support of 
motion to see whether a sufficient showing was 
made, at least where there is no showing that 
the refusal to grant the order was prejudicial 
Anderson v Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P2d 
252 (1943) 
Stipulation and effect thereof. 
Where husband, by stipulation pnor to trial 
in his divorce action, recognized wife's nght to 
temporary alimony and agreed to $50 per 
month or such greater sum as court might fix, 
trial court did not err in awarding temporary 
alimony, at end of trial, in amount of $75 per 
month from commencement of action to entry of 
decree Weiss v Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P2d 
1005 (1947) 
Fact that stipulation between parties prior to 
trial m divorce action by husband provided for 
latter to pay $100 as attorney's fees to enable 
wife to defend action did not preclude trial 
court from awarding additional sum therefor 
even at end of trial after legal services had been 
rendered, since wife did not agree to receive 
stipulated amount as complete and final settle-
ment of all her claims for attorney's fees Weiss 
v Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P2d 1005 (1947) 
Temporary alimony. 
Trial courts have equitable powers to award 
temporary alimony during the pendencv of a 
petition to modify and the trial court erred in 
not considering plaintiff's motion for temporary 
alimony pending the hearing on her petition 
Wells v Wells, 871 P2d 1036 (Utah Ct App 
1994) 
Cited in Hoagland v Hoagland, 852 P2d 
1025 (Utah Ct App 1993), Willey v Willey, 866 
P2d 547 (Utah Ct App 1993), Osguthorpe v 





Am. Jur. 2d. — 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce and tive or anticipated attorneys' fees to enable 
Separation §§ 558-623 parties to maintain or defend divorce suit, 22 
C.J.S. — 27B C J S Divorce §§ 306-368 A L R 4th 407 
A.L.R. — Contract, provision thereof, or Adequacy or excessiveness of amount of 
stipulation waiving wife's right to counsel fees money awarded as temporary alimony, 26 
m event of divorce or separation action, 3 A L R 4th 1218 
A L R 3d 716 Right to attorneys' fees in proceeding, after 
Necessity and sufficiency of notice and hear- absolute divorce, for modification of child cus-
mg as to allowance of suit money or counsel fees tody or support order, 57 A L R 4th 710 
in divorce or other marital action, 10 A L R 3d Power to modify spousal support award for a 
280 limited term, issued in conjunction with di-
Wife's nght to award of counsel fees in final vorce, so as to extend the term or make the 
divorce judgment of trial or appellate court as award permanent, 62 A L R 4th 180 
affected by fact that judgment was rendered Death of obligor spouse as affecting alimony, 
against her, 32 A L R 3d 1227 79 A L R 4th 10 
Amount of attorneys' fees m matters mvolv- Divorce spouse's right to order that other 
ing domestic relations, 59 A L R 3d 152 spouse pay expert witness fees, 4 A L R 5th 
Wife's possession of independent means as 403 
affecting her right to alimony pendente lite, 60 Excessiveness or adequacy of attorneys' fees 
A L R.3d 728 in domestic relations cases, 17 A L R 5th 366. 
Authority of divorce court to award prospec- Key Numbers. — Divorce <$=> 208-229 
30-3-4. Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Sealing. 
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the plaintiff or 
plaintiffs attorney. 
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default or otherwise 
except upon legal evidence taken in the cause. 
(c) If the plaintiff and the defendant have a child or children and the 
plaintiff has filed an action in the judicial district as defined in Section 
78-1-2.1 where the pilot program shall be administered, a decree of divorce 
may not be granted until both parties have attended a mandatory course 
provided in Section 30-3-11 3 and have presented a certificate of course 
completion to the court. The court may waive this requirement, on its own 
motion or on the motion of one of the parties, if it determines course 
attendance and completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in 
the best interest of the parties 
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held before the court or 
the court commissioner as provided by Section 78-3-31 and rules of the 
Judicial Council. The court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall 
make and file findings and decree upon the evidence. 
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by order of the court 
upon the motion of either party. The sealed portion of the file is available to the 
public only upon an order of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of 
record or attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office of 
Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied for or is receiving 
public assistance, or the court have full access to the entire record. This sealing 
does not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1211; L. 1990, ch. 230, § 1; 1991, ch. 5, § 35; 1992, ch. 
1909, ch. 60, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 2999; R.S. 1933 98, § 1; 1992, ch. 290, § 3. 
& C. 1943, 40-3-4; L. 1957, ch. 55, § 1; 1961, Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ch. 59, § 1; 1969, ch. 72, § 2; 1983, ch. 116, ment, effective February 11, 1991, substituted 
§ 1; 1985, ch. 151, § 1; 1989, ch. 104, § 1; "Section 78-3-31" for "Section 78-3-3 1" in the 
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or vice versa, 14 A.L.R.3d 703. Authority of court, upon entering default 
Nunc pro tunc: entering judgment or decree judgment, to make orders for child custody or 
of divorce nunc pro tunc, 19 A.L.R.3d 648. support which were not specifically requested 
Vacating or setting aside divorcfe decree after in pleadings of prevailing party, 5 A.L.R.5th 
remarriage of party, 17 A.L.R.4th 1153. 863. 
Necessity that divorce court value property Key Numbers. — Divorce «=» 88, 152. 
before distributing it, 51 A.L.R.4th 11. 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 230, § 4 repeals authority, duties, and jurisdiction of court com-
these sections, as last amended by L. 1989, ch. missioners, effective April 23, 1990. 
104, §§ 2 to 5, providing for the appointment, 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Division of 
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — 
Custody and visitation — Termination of ali-
mony — Nonmeritorious petition for modifica-
tion. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and 
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, 
and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of 
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabili-
ties and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and 
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after 
January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, an order 
assessing against the obligor an additional $7 per month check processing 
fee to be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of 
Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services for the 
purposes of income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, 
Parts 4 and 5. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
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the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the 
distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and 
necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best 
interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation 
schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to 
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the 
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights 
are determined. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further 
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or associa-
tion is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a 
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or 
defended against in good faith. 
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by 
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the 
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the 
other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation. 
History: R-S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L. est" for "welfare" in Subsection (4); substituted 
1909, ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S. "shall* for "may" and inserted "or defended 
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3; against" in Subsection (7); added Subsection 
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch. (8); and made stylistic changes. 
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1; The 1993 amendment by ch. 261, effective 
1991, ch. 257, § 4; 1993, ch. 152, § 1; 1993, January 1, 1994, inserted "or becomes" in Sub-
ch. 261, § 1; 1994, ch. 284, § 1. section (1Kb), added Subsections (l)(d) and 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- (l)(e), and made related stylistic changes. 
ment effective April 29, 1991, inserted "debts
 T h e 1 9 9 4 a m e n d m e n t ) effective May 2, 1994, 
or obligations in the mtroductory paragraph of
 d e s i g n a t e d Subsection (4) as (4Xa) and added 
Subsection (1), added Subsection (l)(c), and Subsection (4)(b). inserted "and obligations for debts" near the ~ „ . ^ , . , . .. 
end of Subsection (3). . < ^ R e f e r e n c e s . - Grandparents visita-
The 1993 amendment by ch. 152, effective t l 0 n n g n t s ' * 3 0 ' 5 " 2 ' 
May 3, 1993, substituted "members of the im- Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, Title 30, 
mediate family" for "relatives" and "best inter- Chapter 8. 
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78-45-7.5 JUDICIAL CODE 208 
History: C. 1963, 78-46-7.4, enacted J>y L. ment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "base 
1989, ch. 214, § 6; 1994, ch. 118, § 6. combined child support obligation" for "child 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- support award." 
78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed in-
come. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, 
except under Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, 
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, 
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, 
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment 
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from 
"nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one 
full-time job. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training 
Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance; 
and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall 
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employ-
ment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses 
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to 
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to 
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the 
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross 
receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the 
amount of business income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual 
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly 
income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each 
parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and 
complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the 
court finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of 
income from records maintained by the Office of Employment Security 
may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax 
returns. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether 
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection 
(7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates 
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, 
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community. 
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(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at 
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a 
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer 
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to 
the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents* minor children 
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can 
earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he 
cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to 
establish basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the 
custodial parent's presence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the 
subject of a child support award nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
right such as Supplemental Security Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a 
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning 
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation 
of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered as 
income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5; 1994, ment, effective July 1,1994, rewrote Subsection 
ch. 118, § 7. (5)(b). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Deductible expenses. 
Findings by court. 
Imputed income. 
Social Security benefits. 
Cited. 
Deductible expenses. 
The allocation of expenses cannot be dealt 
with as a matter of law under this section; the 
deductibility of particular expenses poses a 
question of fact, turning on whether such ex-
penses are necessary, and, if so, whether they 
exceed those required for the business's opera-
tion at a reasonable level. Bingham v. 
Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Findings by court. 
Although a trial court entered findings re-
quired by Subsection 7(b), since the trial court 
failed to enter any findings required under 
Subsection (7)(a), the findings on the whole 
were insufficient. Hall v. Hall, 858 R2d 1018 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Imputed income. 
Even though the court's findings of fact did 
not include a specific finding that ex-husband 
was underemployed, because he had acquiesced 
to the imputation of income at the trial level 
and because his job history and current employ-
ment options inarguably supported this impu-
tation, the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in imputing income in an amount greater 
than the ex-husband's current salary. Hill v. 
Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Social Security benefits. 
A trial court may, in its discretion, consider a 
child's receipt of Social Security benefits 
against the parent's child support obligation. 
However, a trial court may not order that those 
Social Security benefits be subject to legal pro-
cess. Nunley v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). 
Cited in Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 
472 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTATTG ^ ^ J ; : - ' ^ 
ETYT:_ 
DALE P. HOLT : 
Plaintiff, : RULING 
vs. : Civil No. 934700554 
VICKIE L. HOLT, : 
Defendant. 
The Court took under advisement several issues. These include 
valuation of the plaintiffs business, alimony, determination of the plaintiffs income 
for purposes of child support, tax exemption awards, attorney's fees and costs. The 
Court will address each issue separately. 
Business Valuation 
The estimates of value on the plaintiffs business were varied. They 
ranged from $2.8 million to $11 million. They included values of $2.8 million, $5.4 
million, $9 million and $11 million. The Court finds the value of the business to be 
$2.8 million. It is the most reasonable determination of the fair market value of the 
business. In addition, the Court finds that any goodwill in this case is personal to the 
plaintiff and is not subject to distribution to the defendant as part of the marital estate. 
Quite frankly, it doesn't make any sense to sell the business. It has 
been extremely successful. Both parties would be better off financially if the business 
were maintained. It also doesn't make much sense to require the plaintiff and 
defendant to become business partners after their divorce, since they weren't business 
partners during their marriage. The plaintiff is awarded the business. The defendant 
is awarded $1.4 million as her half of the business. 
The best approach is for the plaintiff to buy the defendant's share of the 
business. The plaintiff has submitted a proposed buy-out plan. (See Exhibit P8) 
Unfortunately, the plan submitted by the plaintiff is based on the premise that any 
transfer to the defendant should account for possible future income tax consequences. 
It shouldn't. Any tax consequences are deferred until assets are sold. This may or 
may not occur. There is no income tax on the division of a marital estate. 
The Court is not compelling a sale of the business. (Although the 
parties have the option to consider a sale.) The Court will allow the parties to present 
proposed buy-out plans. It is the Court's intention that the buy-out occur as soon as 
possible. 
Alimony 
This is a long term marriage. The parties have been married for almost 
22 years. Both parties are in their early forties. 
During the marriage, the defendant worked outside the home until she 
had her first child. She has not worked outside the home for the last 16 years. She 
has a high school education and has had no further courses or training. She has no 
intention of going back to either work or school. She wants to stay home and take 
care of the children. 
The plaintiff has spent the greater part of the marriage building the 
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business into an extremely successful enterprise. He has received local and national 
recognition for his business practices. There is no reason to believe he cannot 
continue to be successful, subject of course, to the uncertainties of the future and his 
eventual retirement. 
The plaintiff is extremely talented and successful. And, although he 
should not be punished economically for either his talent or success, the defendant has 
also made important contributions to the parties' financial well being. She too, should 
share in the economic success. Even though both parties will be awarded substantial 
material assets, plaintiffs assets are income producing and will continue to grow. On 
the other hand, the assets received by the defendant are less capable of producing 
substantial income. By awarding the plaintiff the business, his ability to produce 
income is enhanced. As such, the plaintiff is in a position to provide support to the 
defendant. 
Both parties submitted their monthly expenses. The plaintiffs expenses, 
with one or two exceptions are both reasonable and necessary. The expenses 
submitted by the defendant seem somewhat excessive, although the Court finds that she 
does have significant monthly expenses. To find that either side is in economic "need" 
of alimony, given their material assets, is difficult. However, to award the plaintiff 
the greater income producing property and then not equalize incomes to a certain 
extent seems extremely unfair. 
Finally, in looking at the ability of the defendant to provide support for 
herself, the Court must consider, among other factors, the standard of living the 
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parties acquired during their marriage. Even though both parties acquired substantial 
assets during the marriage, their divorce has divided those assets in half. Without 
assistance from the plaintiff, the defendant will not be able to maintain her same 
standard of living. The defendant is in some need of assistance. 
In order to equalize the income of the parties and to maintain the parties 
standard of living during the marriage, an award of alimony is appropriate. The Court 
awards $2,000 per month permanent alimony to the defendant. It is subject to 
termination upon the defendant's remarriage or co-habitation. It is subject to 
modification only upon a material change of circumstances by either party. 
Plaintiff's income 
Determining the amount of plaintiffs income for the purposes of 
computing child support was the most difficult issue. The Court received evidence 
that the plaintiff had a historical income of approximately $80,000 per year. In 
addition, the Court received evidence that the plaintiff was worth $140,000.00. The 
Court also heard evidence that the plaintiff could also be worth upwards of 
$250,000.00 a year. The best evidence upon which to base the child support 
calculation is to $80,000.00 a year income figure. It is consistent with the parties 
historical yearly income. Although the plaintiff could readily increase or decrease this 
amount, the evidence is consistent that the amount family income remained constant. 
Tax Exemptions 
Traditionally, income tax exemptions belong to the custodial parent. 
The Court can, under certain circumstances, order the custodial parent to release those 
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exemptions to the non-custodial parent. In this instance, the defendant is the custodial 
parent. However, the plaintiff or non-custodial parent meets all the criteria justifying 
a transfer of those exemptions. The plaintiff has a higher income. In addition, the 
plaintiff provides the majority of the support for the children. Although there are tax 
advantages to both parties, given the substantial difference in income and child support 
obligations, the Court finds that a release of the exemptions in this case would be in 
the best interest of the children and the parties. The plaintiff is awarded the tax 
exemptions for the children beginning in 1994. Needless to say, the plaintiff must be 
current on his child support payments to claim the exemptions. 
Attorney's Fees and Court Costs 
In examining attorney's fees, the Court looks at the parties' ability to 
pay attorney's fees, as well as their need to have their attorney's fees paid. The Court 
also looks at which party prevailed on any contested legal issues at trial. In making an 
award of attorney's fees, the Court look at the financial circumstances of both parties. 
In this instance, both parties have the assets, income and ability to pay their own 
attorney's fees. Neither party substantially prevailed on all or most of the contested 
legal issues. In fact, on the two major issues; valuation of the business and alimony, 
different parties prevailed. The plaintiff prevailed on the valuation issue and the 
defendant prevailed on the alimony issue. Each party is ordered to pay their own 
attorney's fees. 
With one exception, each party is to bear their own court costs. Since 
the plaintiff prevailed on the issue concerning evaluation of the parties' business, the 
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defendant is ordered to pay plaintiffs costs for hiring experts to determine the 
business' value. 
Plaintiffs counsel will please prepare findings of facts, conclusions of 
law and a divorce decree consistent with this ruling. Please submit to opposing 
counsel, for approval as to form, prior to submission to the Court for signature. 
One final note: the Court apologizes for the delay in getting this 
decision written. With the Annual Bar conference in Sun Valley, one week's vacation, 
Judge Johnson's retirement and Judge Baldwin's hospitalization, the Court has been 
swamped. 
Dated this ^ftA day of August, A.D., 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDG 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Ruling, postage prepaid on the3(lc\ day of August, 1994, to the following: 
Ann Wassermann David Paul White Ronald C. Barker 
426 South 500 East 5278 Pinemont Dr. 2870 South State 
SLC, UT 84102 Suite A200 SLC, UT 84115-3692 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
DALE E. HOLT, : 
: FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v. : 
VICKIE L. HOLT, : 
Defendant. : Case No. 93470055 DA 
: Judge W. Brent West 
ooOoo 
This matter came on for trial on June 13, 14, and 15, 
1994, the Honorable W. Brent West presiding. Both parties appeared 
in person and were represented by counsel. The Court having heard 
the testimony of the witnesses, having examined the exhibits and 
all evidence, having issued its ruling, and having ruled on 
ancillary matters subsequent to the trial at a hearing held on 
November 5, 1994, and the Court being fully advised, now makes and 
enters the following Findings of Fact: 
1 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff was a resident of Davis County, State of 
Utah, for more than three months prior to the filing of the 
complaint in this action. 
2. Pursuant to Stipulation of the parties, this matter 
was bifurcated and a Decree dissolving the marital relationship 
between the parties was entered on or about June 13, 1994. All 
remaining issues were reserved for final determination. 
3. The parties are the parents of three minor children. 
It is reasonable that the parties be granted the joint legal 
custody of the three minor children. The Plaintiff should be 
designed the primary physical custodian of the oldest child, with 
the Defendant being designated the primary physical custodian of 
the two youngest children. 
4. The Court finds that the children should be able to 
spend as much time with both parents as possible. Each parent is 
entitled, at a minimum, to visitation with any child not in their 
primary physical care in accordance with the Utah statutory minimum 
schedule for visitation. The parties should cooperate in effecting 
visitation, although the children should be entitled to participate 
in decisions with regard to their activities and the visitation. 
Because of the work schedule and travel demands of the Plaintiff, 
the Defendant should be flexible in terms of designating a day 
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during the week for such visitation. The Plaintiff should, 
however, give some reasonable advance notification of the day 
during the week that he wishes to see the children so as to 
accommodate the schedules of the children and of the Defendant. 
The Plaintiff should also be allowed to rearrange weekend 
visitation so as to accommodate his travel schedule, but he should 
give the Defendant two weeks notice of any requests that weekends 
be traded. 
5. The physical custodian should give the non-physical 
custodian parent an opportunity to provide care for the children 
during any substantial periods of time that the physical custodian 
will be unable to provide care for the children. 
6. The parties are mutually restrained from 
threatening, harassing, or annoying each other, or from making 
disparaging remarks to the children about the other parent. The 
Plaintiff should specifically be allowed to pull into the driveway 
at the Defendant's residence in order to pick-up and deliver the 
children, and he should not be deemed to be in violation of any 
restraining or protective order for doing so. 
7. The Court finds, for the purpose of calculating 
child support, that the gross annual income of the Plaintiff is 
approximately $80,000 per year. This figure is consistent with the 
historical annual income of the parties. The Defendant is 
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unemployed. Based upon the current circumstances of the parties, 
the Plaintiff should pay child support to the Defendant, effective 
upon the entry of this Order, in the monthly amount of $997, which 
amount is reflective of the split custodial arrangement and the 
current incomes of the parties. 
8. The Court finds that there is good cause to award to 
the Plaintiff all of the income tax exemptions for the minor 
children. The justification for this finding includes, but is not 
limited, the fact that the Plaintiff has a higher income, provides 
a majority of support for the children, and can derive greater tax 
advantage from use of the exemptions. The Court further finds that 
an award of the exemptions to the Plaintiff would be in the best 
interests of the children. The Plaintiff, therefore, should be 
awarded the income tax exemptions for all of the minor children of 
the parties, provided, however, that the Plaintiff should not be 
entitled to take the exemptions for any year in which he is not 
current in all child support payments. 
9. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has been timely 
in his payment of temporary child support, and good cause exists 
for a waiver of the mandatory income withholding provisions of Utah 
law. In the event the Plaintiff becomes delinquent in the payment 
of child support, the Defendant should be entitled to an order of 
automatic income withholding. 
4 
10. The Plaintiff should be required to maintain a 
policy of health and medical insurance for the benefit of all the 
minor children. The parties should share equally the costs of such 
insurance, any deductibles, or any costs incurred not covered by 
such insurance. 
11. The Plaintiff should be required to maintain a 
policy of life insurance in a face amount sufficient to insure the 
payment of his child support obligation for the benefit of the 
minor children, with the Defendant as the trustee. Any life 
insurance coverage for the benefit of the minor children above and 
beyond such coverage should be at the sole option of the Plaintiff, 
and he should be entitled to designate as trustee any person whom 
he chooses. 
12. There are certain policies of life insurance on the 
life of the Defendant. To the extent that she wants to keep 
enforce such insurance coverage, she may assume the policies, but 
she should be responsible for payment of any premiums associated 
therewith. 
13. The Defendant made certain claims with respect to 
Willowcreek and Oakridge Country Club memberships. With respect to 
the Willowcreek membership, the Court finds that the membership has 
already been sold and the proceeds divided equally, and the 
Defendant has no existing claim to any additional compensation. 
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With regard to the Oakridge Country Club membership, that 
membership is owned by the Plaintiff's business, Codale Electric, 
Inc., and the value of the membership has been figured into the 
valuation of the business as set forth herein. The Court finds 
there is no basis to require the Plaintiff to purchase a membership 
for the benefit of the Defendant. 
14. During the course of the marriage the parties 
acquired various items of personal property. Several of the items 
have been divided by the parties, and each should be awarded those 
items in their possession, with the following exceptions. There 
are eight items in dispute, which should be divided equally between 
the parties. Counsel for the parties should arrange a mechanism 
whereby one or the other of the parties is entitled to the first 
choice, with the items being picked alternately by Plaintiff and 
Defendant. The items to be divided in this manner are as follows: 
Sony 2 7" TV, contents of wall unit, TV cabinet, encyclopedia, 
washer, dryer, lawn furniture, and snow blower. 
15. During the course of the marriage the Plaintiff 
acquired ownership of 97.6% of the outstanding stock in Codale 
Electric Supply, Inc. The Court considered extensive evidence 
regarding the value of the business. The Plaintiff's expert, Mr. 
Dave Dorton, testified that the value of one hundred percent of the 
stock of the business is $2.8 million dollars. The Defendant's 
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expert testified as to values ranging from a liquidation value of 
$2.8 million dollars to valuations of $11 million dollars. The 
Court finds convincing and persuasive the testimony of the expert 
for the Plaintiff. The experts appear to be in agreement that the 
value of the company without the services of Dale Holt, or in the 
absence of a long term employment contract or non-compete 
agreement, is $2.8 million dollars. The Court finds that the 
company, by itself, has basically no good-will, and that the good-
will of the business is attributable to Mr. Holt as an individual. 
The value of the 97.6% interest owned by the marital estate is 
$2,732,000. 
16. The Court does not find that it is reasonable, as 
Defendant has requested, to sell the business. Furthermore, it is 
not reasonable to allow the Defendant to retain one-half of the 
parties' stock in Codale, as the Court finds this would be 
detrimental to the conduct of the business. Accordingly, the Court 
finds that the parties, in conjunction with the business itself, 
should arrive at a plan to acquire the Defendant's one-half 
interest in the shares owned by the parties in a manner so as to 
minimize tax consequences as much as possible to the Defendant, but 
allow the business to function properly. 
17. During the course of the marriage, the parties have 
acquired various additional assets, the values of which have been 
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stipulated by the parties or of which are not in dispute. The 
Court finds that as of the date of the hearing in this matter these 
assets are as follows: personal residence located in Bountiful, 
Utah valued at $153,000; Codale Electric Supply, Inc., stock value 
$2,732,000; Holt Properties Partnership $360,488; Individual 
Retirement Account, $20,323; 401(k) retirement account $89,789; 
Retirement Plan $133,109; and Note payable $16,000. The only 
liability of the marital estate is the sum of $23,250, which 
represents the income taxes payable. The Court notes that the 
above values do not include the personal possessions of the 
parties, including household furnishings, jewelry, and automobiles. 
It is reasonable that the parties each receive one-half of the net 
value of the marital estate. 
18. After subtracting the income taxes payable in the 
amount of $23,250 from the marital estate (and the Court hereby 
finds that the Plaintiff should be responsible to insure that the 
income taxes are paid), each of the parties is entitled to assets 
totalling $1,740,639. The Court finds that the assets should be 
distributed as follows: 
To the Defendant: 
Personal Residence $ 153,000 
IRA Account 20,323 
401(k) Retirement Account 89,7 89 
Retirement Plan 133,109 
Buy Out of Codale Shares to Equalize 
Assets 1,344,509 
8 
To the Plaintiff: 
Codale Electric Supply, Inc. Stock 100% of stock 
owned by the 
parties 
Holt Properties Partnership 360,488 
Note Payable 16,000 
19. The Defendant's stock in Codale Electric Supply, 
Inc., should be redeemed by the corporation or purchased as 
follows: an initial payment of $500,000 should be made to the 
Defendant no later than 60 days from the entry of these Findings 
and Order. Within one year from the due date for the first 
payment, an additional amount in the amount of $422,254 shall be 
made, together with interest accrued thereon from the date the 
initial payment was due at the rate of 4% per annum. The final 
payment of $422,254 should be made no later than one year 
thereafter, together with interest on that installment at the rate 
of 4% per annum, said interest accruing from the date the first 
payment was made. 
20. The Court finds that it is reasonable that each 
party pay any income tax liability, including capital gains, 
resulting from a sale of any assets awarded to that party, 
specifically including funds paid to the Defendant for the purchase 
of her shares in Codale Electric Supply, Inc. With respect to the 
redemption of the shares of Codale, the Defendant is ordered to pay 
9 
any tax liability assessed, and to indemnify the Plaintiff and hold 
him harmless with regard to such tax consequences. 
21. The parties acquired a 1979 MGB automobile, which is 
currently held in storage. The automobile should be sold, with the 
parties sharing equally the proceeds. In addition, the Defendant 
has in her possession a 1988 Ford Bronco valued at $8,775 and a 
1987 BMW M6, valued at $19,250. Both of those automobiles are 
owned by Codale Electric Supply, Inc. The Defendant is hereby 
awarded the automobiles, subject to her obligation to reimburse the 
corporation for the value of the cars. The value of the cars may 
be deducted from the initial $500,000 payment, if the Defendant so 
desires. 
22. Any interest accrued in the IRA, Retirement account, 
or 401(k) account from the hearing in this matter through the date 
of distribution should be divided equally by the parties. 
23. As of the trial in this matter, the parties had been 
married almost 22 years. Both parties are in their early forties. 
The Defendant has not been employed outside of the home for the 
last sixteen years, and has stated an intention not to go to work 
or back to school. The Plaintiff has worked during the marriage 
and is a successful businessman. Although the Defendant has not 
worked in the business, she has contributed to the financial well-
being of the parties, and should share in the economic success. 
10 
Both parties will be awarded substantial assets in this matter. 
The Court finds the assets awarded to the Plaintiff may produce 
more income in the future than those awarded to the Defendant. 
24. Both parties have submitted statements of expenses. 
With one or two exceptions, the Plaintiff's expenses seem 
reasonable and necessary. The expenses alleged by the Defendant 
seem excessive. The Court finds that, during the marriage, the 
average monthly expenses of the family of five were in the range of 
$3,800 to $4,200 for the last three that the family lived together 
as a whole. During the period of the pendency of the temporary 
orders of this Court, the Defendant received total temporary 
support for herself and two of the minor children in the amount of 
$1,538 per month. During the period of the temporary orders, the 
Defendant did not incur any additional debt. 
25. The Court finds that, based upon current 
circumstances, the cash payments to the Defendant could earn tax 
free income at a rate of no less than six percent per annum. 
26. The Court finds that indefinite alimony is 
appropriate in this case. The Plaintiff should pay to Defendant 
alimony in the amount of $2,000 per month from the entry of this 
judgment. Said alimony should terminate upon the Defendant's 
cohabitation, remarriage, or death. 
11 
27. Both parties incurred substantial attorney's fees 
and expert witness fees. The Court finds that, with the 
distribution of assets, it is reasonable that each party pay their 
own attorney's fees and costs. Provided, however, that the 
Defendant should pay the expert witness fees incurred by Plaintiff 
in the approximate amount of $9,500. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes and enters its Conclusions of Law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. A final Order and Judgment should enter 
incorporating the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of the Court as 
set forth herein. 
DATED this ** * day of TSJOVMHW
 f 199S. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE W. BRENT WEST 
District Court Judge 
12 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing, FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, this /^r day of December, 1994, to: 
Mr. Ronald C. Barker, Esq. 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorney for Defendant 
Mr. David Paul White 
5278 Pinemont Drive, #A200 
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ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395 ' ' ""LE;"T/1T^" 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
DALE E. HOLT, : 
: ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
VICKIE L. HOLT, : 
Defendant. : Case No. 93470055 DA 
: Judge W. Brent West 
ooOoo 
This matter came on for trial on June 13, 14, and 15, 
1994, the Honorable W. Brent West presiding. Both parties appeared 
in person and were represented by counsel. The Court having heard 
the testimony of the witnesses, having examined the exhibits and 
all evidence, having issued its ruling, and having ruled on 
ancillary matters subsequent to the trial at a hearing held on 
November 5, 1994, and the Court being fully advised, and having 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and good cause 
appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1, 
1. The parties are the parents of three minor children. 
The parties are granted the joint legal custody of the three minor 
children. The Plaintiff shall be designed the primary physical 
custodian of the oldest child, with the Defendant being designated 
the primary physical custodian of the two youngest children. 
2. The children shall be able to spend as much time 
with both parents as possible. Each parent is entitled, at a 
minimum, to visitation with any child not in their primary physical 
care in accordance with the Utah statutory minimum schedule for 
visitation. The parties shall cooperate in effecting visitation, 
although the children shall be entitled to participate in decisions 
with regard to their activities and the visitation. Because of the 
work schedule and travel demands of the Plaintiff, the Defendant 
shall be flexible in terms of designating a day during the week for 
such visitation. The Plaintiff shall, however, give some 
reasonable advance notification of the day during the week that he 
wishes to see the children so as to accommodate the schedules of 
the children and of the Defendant. The Plaintiff shall also be 
allowed to rearrange weekend visitation so as to accommodate his 
travel schedule, but he shall give the Defendant two weeks notice 
of any requests that weekends be traded. 
3. The physical custodian shall give the non-physical 
custodian parent an opportunity to provide care for the children 
2 
during any substantial periods of time that the physical custodian 
will be able to provide care for the children. 
4. The parties are mutually restrained from 
threatening, harassing, or annoying each other, or from making 
disparaging remarks to the children about the other parent. The 
Plaintiff shall specifically be allowed to pull into the driveway 
at the Defendant's residence in order to pick-up and deliver the 
children, and he shall not be deemed to be in violation of any 
restraining or protective order for doing so. 
5. Based upon the current circumstances of the parties, 
the Plaintiff shall pay child support to the Defendant, effective 
upon the entry of this Order, in the monthly amount of $997, which 
amount is reflective of the split custodial arrangement and the 
current incomes of the parties. 
6. The Plaintiff is awarded the income tax exemptions 
for all of the minor children of the parties, provided, however, 
that the Plaintiff shall not be entitled to take the exemptions for 
any year in which he is not current in all child support payments. 
7. The Plaintiff has been timely in his payment of 
temporary child support, and good cause exists for a waiver of the 
mandatory income withholding provisions of Utah law. In the event 
the Plaintiff becomes delinquent in the payment of child support, 
3 
the Defendant shall be entitled to an order of automatic income 
withholding. 
8. The Plaintiff shall be required to maintain a policy 
of health and medical insurance for the benefit of all the minor 
children. The parties shall share equally the costs of such 
insurance, any deductibles, or any costs incurred not covered by 
such insurance. 
9. The Plaintiff shall be required to maintain a policy 
of life insurance in a face amount sufficient to insure the payment 
of his child support obligation for the benefit of the minor 
children, with the Defendant as the trustee. Any life insurance 
coverage for the benefit of the minor children above and beyond 
such coverage shall be at the sole option of the Plaintiff, and he 
shall be entitled to designate as trustee any person whom he 
chooses. 
10. There are certain policies of life insurance on the 
life of the Defendant. To the extent that she wants to keep 
enforce such insurance coverage, she may assume the policies, but 
she shall be responsible for payment of any premiums associated 
therewith. 
11. The Defendant made certain claims with respect to 
Willowcreek and Oakridge Country Club memberships. With respect to 
the Willowcreek membership, that the membership has already been 
4 
sold and the proceeds divided equally, and the Defendant has no 
existing claim to any additional compensation. With regard to the 
Oakridge Country Club membership, that membership is owned by the 
Plaintiff's business, Codale Electric, Inc., and the value of the 
membership has been figured into the valuation of the business as 
set forth herein. There is no basis to require the Plaintiff to 
purchase a membership for the benefit of the Defendant. 
12. During the course of the marriage the parties 
acquired various items of personal property. Several of the items 
have been divided by the parties, and each shall be awarded those 
items in their possession, with the following exceptions. There 
are eight items in dispute, which shall be divided equally between 
the parties. Counsel for the parties shall arrange a mechanism 
whereby one or the other of the parties is entitled to the first 
choice, with the items being picked alternately by Plaintiff and 
Defendant. The items to be divided in this manner are as follows: 
Sony 27" TV, contents of wall unit, TV cabinet, encyclopedia, 
washer, dryer, lawn furniture, and snow blower. 
13. The value of the 97.6% interest owned by the marital 
estate is $2,732,000. 
14. The parties, in conjunction with the business 
itself, shall arrive at a plan to acquire the Defendant's one-half 
interest in the shares owned by the parties in a manner so as to 
5 
minimize tax consequences as much as possible to the Defendant, but 
allow the business to function properly. 
15. During the course of the marriage, the parties have 
acquired various additional assets, the values of which have been 
stipulated by the parties or of which are not in dispute. The 
Court finds that as of the date of the hearing in this matter these 
assets are as follows: personal residence located in Bountiful, 
Utah valued at $153,000; Codale Electric Supply, Inc., stock value 
$2,732,000; Holt Properties Partnership $360,488; Individual 
Retirement Account, $20,323; 401(k) retirement account $89,789; 
Retirement Plan $133,109; and Note payable $16,000. The only 
liability of the marital estate is the sum of $23,250, which 
represents the income taxes payable. The Court notes that the 
above values do not include the personal possessions of the 
parties, including household furnishings, jewelry, and automobiles. 
The parties shall each receive one-half of the net value of the 
marital estate. 
16. After subtracting the income taxes payable in the 
amount of $23,250 from the marital estate (and the Court hereby 
finds that the Plaintiff shall be responsible to insure that the 
income taxes are paid), each of the parties is entitled to assets 
totalling $1,740,639. The Court finds that the assets shall be 
distributed as follows: 
6 
To the Defendant: 
Personal Residence $ 153,000 
IRA Account 20,323 
401(k) Retirement Account 89,789 
Retirement Plan 133,109 
Buy Out of Codale Shares to Equalize 
Assets 1,344,509 
To the Plaintiff: 
Codale Electric Supply, Inc. Stock 100% of stock 
owned by the 
parties 
Holt Properties Partnership 360,488 
Note Payable 16,000 
17. The Defendant's stock in Codale Electric Supply, 
Inc., shall be redeemed by the corporation or purchased as follows: 
an initial payment of $500,000 shall be made to the Defendant no 
later than 60 days from the entry of these Findings and Order. 
Within one year from the due date for the first payment, an 
additional amount in the amount of $422,254 shall be made, together 
with interest accrued thereon from the date the initial payment was 
due at the rate of 4% per annum. The final payment of $422,254 
shall be made no later than one year thereafter, together with 
interest on that installment at the rate of 4% per annum, said 
interest accruing from the date the first payment was made. 
18. Each party shall pay any income tax liability, 
including capital gains, resulting from a sale of any assets 
awarded to that party, specifically including funds paid to the 
Defendant for the purchase of her shares in Codale Electric Supply, 
7 
Inc. With respect to the redemption of the shares of Codale, the 
Defendant is ordered to pay any tax liability assessed, and to 
indemnify the Plaintiff and hold him harmless with regard to such 
tax consequences. 
19. The parties acquired a 1979 MGB automobile, which is 
currently held in storage. The automobile shall be sold, with the 
parties sharing equally the proceeds. In addition, the Defendant 
has in her possession a 1988 Ford Bronco valued at $8,775 and a 
1987 BMW M6, valued at $19,250. Both of those automobiles are 
owned by Codale Electric Supply, Inc. The Defendant is hereby 
awarded the automobiles, subject to her obligation to reimburse the 
corporation for the value of the cars. The value of the cars may 
be deducted from the initial $500,000 payment, if the Defendant so 
desires. 
20. Any interest accrued in the IRA, Retirement account, 
or 401(k) account from the hearing in this matter through the date 
of distribution shall be divided equally by the parties. 
21. Indefinite alimony is appropriate in this case and 
the Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant alimony in the amount of 
$2,000 per month from the entry of this judgment. Said alimony 
shall terminate upon the Defendant's cohabitation, remarriage, or 
death. 
8 
22. Both parties incurred substantial attorney's fees 
and expert witness fees. The Court finds thatf with the 
distribution of assets, each party shall pay their own attorney's 
fees and costs. Provided, however, that the Defendant shall pay 
the expert witness fees incurred by Plaintiff in the approximate 
amount of $9,500. 
DATED this 4 ~ day of VhrJwrt>l , 199/. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE W. BRENT WEST 
District Court Judge 
9 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing, ORDER AND JUDGMENT, this [j^ day 
of December, 1994, to: 
Mr. Ronald C. Barker, Esq. 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorney for Defendant 
Mr. David Paul White 
5278 Pinemont Drive, #A200 





ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
DALE P. HOLT, : 
: ORDER ON POST TRIAL MOTIONS 
Plaintiff, : 
v. ; 
VICKI L. HOLT, : 
Defendant. : Case No. 934700554 DA 
: Judge W. Brent West 
ooOoo 
This matter came on for hearing on November 4, 1994, the 
Honorable W. Brent West presiding. The Plaintiff appeared in 
person and was represented by counsel, Ann L. Wassermann, Esq. The 
Defendant appeared personally and was represented by counsel David 
Paul White, Esq. and Ronald C. Barker, Esq. Before the Court were 
various post-trial motions and requests for clarification filed on 
behalf of both parties. The Court having reviewed the pleadings 
submitted by the parties, having heard the arguments of counsel, 
and being fully advised, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1 
1. The MG automobile that is currently in storage 
should be sold, with the parties to share equally the proceeds. 
2. The parties are to share equally any earnings in the 
various retirement accounts accrued from the date of valuation as 
presented to the Court at trial to the date of distribution. 
3. The parties are to share equally the costs of making 
copies of the family photographs. 
4. The Plaintiff's proposal with regard to the 
purchase/redemption of the Defendant's interest in Codale Electric 
Supply, Inc., is hereby adopted by the Court. The Court finds that 
the time periods for payment to the Defendant as proposed by the 
Plaintiff are reasonable. 
5. The Defendant is responsible to pay any income tax 
consequences incurred as result of the redemption/purchase of her 
interest in Codale Electric Supply, Inc. She should indemnify and 
hold the Plaintiff harmless from any income tax liability for such 
purchase. 
6. The Defendant's request that she receive the real 
property owed by Holt Properties as a part of the distribution of 
the marital estate is denied. 
7. Any amounts owed by the Plaintiff to the Defendant 
with regard to the purchase of the Defendant's interest in Codale 
Electric Supply, Inc., sh^ll accrue interest at the rate of four 
2 
percent (4%) per annum, which shall accrue on unpaid amounts from 
the date of the first required payment (i.e. sixty days from the 
date of entry of the fina?. order in this matter) until paid in 
full. 
8. The request for both parties to reconsider the 
alimony award is hereby denied. 
9. The Court does specifically find that, during the 
period of time when the parties and their three children lived 
together, their reasonable monthly expenses ranged between $3,800 
and $4,200. 
10. The Court specifically finds that the cash assets 
awarded to the Defendant, and the cash payments for her interest in 
Codale Electric Supply, I^c, could reasonably be anticipated to 
generate tax free income at an annual rate of no less than six 
percent (6%). 
11. The motion to reconsider the Court's rulings with 
regard to attorney's fees and expert witnesses fees is denied. 
12. The Defendant has made certain claims for 
reimbursement of expenses pursuant to the temporary order in this 
matter, which expenses have accrued through the date of the 
hearing. With regard to these claims, the Plaintiff is ordered to 
reimburse the Defendant as follows: 
3 
a. $89.19 for prescriptions for the benefit of the 
minor children. 
b. One-half of the cost of past therapy for the 
minor children. Defendant is to bear the costs of her own therapy. 
Any further therapy foi the children shall be evaluated by both 
parties and a determination of the continued need and cost of 
therapy shall be agreed upon. In the absence of agreement, no 
further costs shall be incurred, 
c. $193.83 representing reimbursement for the 
repair of the water softener, water heater, and refrigerator 
repair. The Defendant is ordered to assume responsibility for the 
cost of lawn fertilizer, the purchase of yard plants and carpet 
cleaning. 
d. $281.34 for reimbursement for the cost of 
certain yard maintenance, including deck stain, sprinkler parts, 
and the lawn mower blade. The Defendant is responsible for the 
remaining costs, including the hot tub repair. 
e. $204.84 representing care maintenance. The 
Defendant is ordered to pay the registration fees of $310.00 and 
the taxes on the BMW automobile. 
f. The Defendant is ordered to pay the property 
taxes of $892. 
4 
g. Orthodontic expense is to be divided equally. 
The parties should endeavor to obtain a contract with the 
orthodontist, and should also explore insurance coverage. The 
parties should pay equally any costs not covered by insurance, 
including any deductible or uninsured amounts. 
13. The Defendant's motion for an award of child support 
for the month of August, 1994 is denied. 
DATED this 20U day of 5*rOUyW 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
k &S- te§: 
District Court Judge 
5 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing, ORDER ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS, this 
1 £ day of January,.1995, to: 
Mr. David Paul White, Esq. 
7434 South State, #102 
Midvale, Utah 84 04 7 
Mr. Ronald C. Barker, Esq. 
2870 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 




David Paul White, #3441 
Attorney for Defendant 
7434 South State St. #102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone (801) 566-8188 
Ronald C. Barker, #0208 
Co-Counsel for Defendant 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone (801) 486-9636 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
) DEFENDANT'S URCP 59 MOTION 
TO ALTER OR AMEND FINDINGS, 
) CONCLUSIONS, ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT, ORDER ON POST 
) TRIAL MOTIONS, TO DISTRIBUTE 
ADDITIONAL ASSETS OR FOR A NEW 
) TRIAL 
) Civil No. 934700554 DA 
) Judge W. Brent West 
ooOoo 
I 
Defendant's additional Motions 
Defendant also moves the Court for orders as follows. 
h 
Motion For a New Trial 
1. New trial - For a new trial based upon each of the 
following grounds: 
nt-ci' !' (,_~ •- - - -
FEB o 2 m ?\\' 
DALE P. HOLT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VICKIE L. HOLT, 
Defendant. 
I 
(a) Accident or surprise - Pursuant to URCP 59(a) (3). 
Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(b) Newlv discovered evidence - Pursuant to URCP 59(a) (4) 
Newly discovered material evidence which defendant could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(c) Inadequate damages - Pursuant to URCP 59(a) (5). 
Inadequate damages. 
(d) Insufficiency of evidence - Pursuant to URCP 59(a) (6) 
Insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision and/or because 
the decision is against law, and/or 
(e) Error in law - Pursuant to URCP 59(a) (7) . Error in law. 
1 
Motion to Alter or Amend 
2. To alter or amend judgment and orders - Defendant also 
moved the Court pursuant to URCP 59(e) for an order altering or 
amending said Findings, Conclusions, Order and/or Judgment and 
Order on Post Trial Motions and other applicable judgments and/or 
orders. 
2 
3. Incorporation of prior motions by reference - Defendant 
also hereby incorporates herein and re-alleges the contents of her 
Motions and Memorandum entitled "Defendants Memorandum re Motion to 
Correct ruling and to Distribute Additional Assets or For a New 
Trial" dated 11/3/94," which was entered herein on January 10, 
1995, together with the exhibits and affidavits thereto,1 a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Ex. #1. Although said motions 
addressed the Court's Ruling, and were prepared prior to entry of 
the Court's Findings, Conclusions, Order and Judgment, Order on 
Post Trial Motions, etc., since there was little change from the 
Court's Ruling, the matters argued therein also apply to the 
Court's Findings, Conclusions, Order and Judgment, Order on Post 
Trial Motions, etc. mentioned above. Reference thereon to the 
Court's Ruling is hereby amended to refer to the Court's Findings, 
Conclusions, Order and Judgment, Order on Post Trial Motions, etc. 
4. Order on Post Trial Motions purports to deny defendant7 s 
11/3/94 motions which were reserved by the Court - At the 11/4/94 
hearing, the Court declined to consider oral argument raised by 
defendant's 11/3/94 motion, and invited defendant to bring those 
matters before the Court after entry of the Findings, Conclusions 
1
 A copy of defendant's 11/3/94 memorandum is attached 
hereto as Ex. #1. 
3 
and Order. To the extent that the "Order on Post Trial Motions" 
purports to deny defendant's motions contained therein, defendant 
moves the Court for an order vacating said order and permitting 
oral argument of the matters asserted in defendant's 11/3/94 
motion, Exhibit #1 hereto. 
Supporting Affidavits, Exhibits, Memorandum, etc. 
5. Supporting documents - The above-mentioned motions are 
supported by this Memorandum of Authorities and by the affidavits 
of defendant (below), of Paul Shields,2 of Robert Hunter3 and by 
exhibits thereto, together with testimony and exhibits received in 
evidence at the trial of this matter. 
1 
Matters to which Defendant s Motions pertain 
6. Findings, Conclusions, Judgment & Orders, Order on Post 
Trial Motions, etc. to which defendants motions pertain 
Defendant's motions pertain to the Court's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment entered in the above-
entitled matter about 1/10/95; also to the Court's Order on Post 
Trial Motions entered herein about 1/25/95; and generally to all 
2
 A copy of which is filed herewith as Exhibit #2* 
3
 A copy of which is filed herewith as Exhibit #3. 
4 
of the Courts orders and decisions with respect to distribution of 
assets, payment of income taxes which may be incurred as a result 
of the Court's decision, the award of alimony and child support, 
payment of expert witness fees, attorney fees and costs, life 
insurance, mandatory income withholding, and to other orders which 
pertain to financial matters. 
Dated February 6, 1995. 
DAVID PAUL WHITE and RONALD C. BARKER 
Attorneys for defendant 
, (FL«^JJ> £ SU^L By 
Ronald C. Barker 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, of the Affidavits of Paul Shields and Robert Hunter, and 
of exhibits thereto to be mailed, postage prepaid, and/or to be 
hand delivered the 6th day of February, 1995 to Ann L. Wasserman, 
Esq., LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON, 426 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, and/or to be transmitted via FAX #(801) 575-7834. 




David Paul White, #3441 
Attorney for Defendant 
7434 South State St. #102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone (801) 566-8188 
Ronald C. Barker, #0208 
Co-Counsel for Defendant 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone (801) 486-9636 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo— 
DALE P. HOLT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VICKI L. HOLT, 
Defendant. 
ORDER IN RE: DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGMENT, 
FOR A NEW TRIAL, ETC. 
Case No. 934700554 DA 
Judge W. Brent West 
—ooOoo— 
This matter came on for hearing on February 14, 1995. The 
hearing was conducted by conference call, the Honorable W. Brent 
West presiding. Participants in the call were the Court, Ann L. 
Wassermann, counsel for Plaintiff, Ronald L. Barker and David Paul 
White, counsel for Defendant. The Court having reviewed the Motion 
of the Defendant to correct judgment, for a new trial, etc., having 
reviewed the Memorandum, and the two errata to the 
Memorandum, and the Court having considered the comments of 
1 
counsel, and being fully advised, now makes and enters the 
following Findings and Order: 
1. The Court finds that some of the matters raised by the 
Defendant were previously considered and heard by the Court on 
November 4, 1994 and that the additional matters presented by 
defendant's motion have not persuaded the Court to change its prior 
ruling. Accordingly, the Order on post-trial motions previously 
entered by the Court should stand as, entered except as modified in 
5 3 below. 
2. The Court finds that the Defendant has failed to produce 
any new evidence with regard to assets of the parties. 
3. Each of the parties is awarded ownership of h of the 
cemetery lots. 
4. Defendant's motion for a new trial is hereby denied. 
DATED this 1\*~ day of .Esbnrary, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: r^ 
HONORABLE W. BRENT WEST 
District Court Judge 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing revised proposed ORDER IN RE: 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGMENT, FOR A NEW TRIAL, ETC., this 
24th day of February, 1995, to: 
ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
3 
Tab 10 
E. PAUL WOOD - 3537 
ANN L. WASSERMAN - A3395 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
Attorneys for Dale P. Holt, 
Appellee and Cross Appellant 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
DALE P. HOLT, : MOTION TO STRIKE PORTION 
: OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff, Appellee : 
and Cross Appellant, : 
v. : 
VICKIE L. HOLT, : 
Defendant, Appellant : Case No. 950169-CA 
and Cross Appellee : Judge 
ooOoo 
Appellee and Cross Appellant, Dale P. Holt, by and 
through his undersigned attorneys of record, moves this court 
pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to 
strike portions of Appellant Vickie Holt's Brief. A list of the 
specific texts of the Brief which Mr. Holt moves to be stricken is 
attached as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference. A 
significant portion of Mrs. Holt's Brief contains references to 
evidence submitted post-trial and not considered by the Court when 
making its ruling. All references to the post-trial evidence, the 
post-trial evidence itself and arguments based upon the post-trial 
evidence should be stricken. 
The factual background for this Motion is: 
1. On April 16, 1993, Dale P. Holt ("Mr. Holt") filed 
a Complaint for Divorce against his wife, Vickie L. Holt ("Mrs. 
Holt") . 
2. On May 13, 1993, Mrs. Holt filed a Verified Answer 
and Counterclaim for Divorce. 
3. Trial on the Complaint and Counterclaim was held 
before the Honorable W. Brent West, Second District Court Judge 
presiding June 13 to June 15, 1994. 
4. On June 15, 1994, the Court ruled on custody and 
visitation issues and reserved all economic issues for further 
ruling. 
5. On August 3, 1994, the Court entered its ruling 
awarding alimony, dividing the marital estate and awarding tax 
exemption and fees and requesting the parties to present proposed 
buy-out plans. 
6. On November 4, 1994, Mr. Holt filed a Motion to 
Clarify Supplement and/or Reconsider Findings and submitted a Plan 
for redeeming Mrs. Holt's stock. 
7. On November 4, 1994, Mrs. Holt filed a Motion to 
Correct Ruling and to Distribute Additional Assets or for a New 
Trial. 
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8. Both Motions were heard November 5, 1994. 
9. On January 4, 1995, the Court entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgment, on the June 
13-15, 1994 Trial and November 5, 1994 Hearing on Post-Trial 
Motions. 
10. On January 20, 1995, the Court entered an additional 
Order on Post-Trial Motions. 
11. On February 2, 1995, Mrs. Holt filed a voluminous 
(over 100 pages) Rule 59 Motion to Alter Amend Findings, 
Conclusions, Order and Judgment, Order on Post-Trial Motions, to 
Distribute Additional Assets or for a New Trial, a copy of which is 
attached as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by reference. 
Attached to the Memorandum of Points and Authorities are Affidavits 
of Paul Shields and Robert H. Hunter, Certified Public Accountants 
which contain evidence, summaries, charts and other matters not 
considered by the Court either in its June 13-15, 1994 Trial or in 
the November 5, 1994 Hearing. 
12. Additionally, several corrections to the supporting 
Memorandum and Affidavits were subsequently added by Mrs. Holt. 
13. On March 7, 1995, Mrs. Holt filed Notice of Appeal. 
14. On March 21, 1995, the trial court entered its Order 
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on Post-Trial Motions, denying all relief requested by Mrs, Holt, 
a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein 
by reference• 
15. On January 17, 1996, Mrs. Holt filed her Appellant's 
Brief with this Court. 
16. On February 7, 1996, Mrs. Holt filed her Corrected 
Appellant's Brief with this Court. 
17. Mrs. Holt's Corrected Appellant's Brief contains 
numerous citations to the Affidavit of Paul Shields and Robert 
Hunter attached to the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of the Rule 59 Motion and several arguments based thereon. 
The trial court did not have before it any of this evidence during 
the June 13-15, 1994 Trial or during the November 5, 1994 Hearing 
on the Post-Trial Motion. 
DATED this fat^ day of May, 1996. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
By:/E. Paul Wood, Esq. 
Attorneys for Dale P. Holt 
Appellee and Cross Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true copy 
of the foregoing, Motion to Strike Portion of Appellant's Brief, 
this ^ ^ d a y of May, 1996, to: 
RONALD C. BARKER 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692 
DAVID PAUL WHITE 
5278 Pinemont Drive, #A-200 





Appellant Vickie L. Holt's Corrected Brief of Appellant 
filed February 7, 1996 contains references to the Affidavits of 
Paul Shield and Robert Hunter, and attachments to their respective 
Affidavits and contention based on Paul Shield's and Robert 
Hunter's Affidavits in the text of the Brief; 
All references to the "Record ("R") after record page 400 
are outside the scope of evidence heard at trial or in the November 
5, 1994 Hearing, 










P. 1, para. 
para. 
para. 
P. 2, para. 
P. 4, para. 










P. 9-10, subpara. (f) 
P. 13, subp< 




Reference to Post-Trial Evidence 
Paul Shield's Affidavit 
26 U.S.C.S. §01041 
1994 Commerce Clearing House 
Income Taxes 
26 U.S.C.S. §301 
§301 Distribution of Property 
Technical Advice Memorandum 
July 20, 1990 
Article, Journal of Corporate 
Taxation 
Affidavit of Robert H. Hunter 
Attachment to Paul Shield's 
Affidavit 
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P. 43, entire page 
P. 44, top of page 
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David Paul White, #3441 
Attorney for Defendant 
7434 South State St.' #102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone (801) 566-8188 
Ronald C. Barker, #0208 
Co-Counsel for Defendant 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone (801) 486-9636 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
DALE P. HOLT, ) DEFENDANT'S URCP 59 MOTION 
TO ALTER OR AMEND FINDINGS, 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS, ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT, ORDER ON POST 
vs. ) TRIAL MOTIONS, TO DISTRIBUTE 
ADDITIONAL ASSETS OR FOR A NEW 
) TRIAL 





Defendant's additional Motions 
Defendant also moves the Court fcr oroers as follows. 
A 
Motion For a New Tr^aj, 
1. New trial - For a new trial rased uc-on each of the 
following grounds: 
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(a) Accident or surprise - Pursuant to URCP 59(a) (3) . 
Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against* 
(b) Newly discovered evidence - Pursuant to URCP 59(a) (4) 
Newly discovered material evidence which defendant could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(c) Inadequate damages - Pursuant to URCP 59(a) (5) . 
Inadequate damages. 
(d) Insufficiency of evidence - Pursuant to URCP 59(a) (6) 
Insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision and/or because 
the decision is against law, and/or 
(e) Error in law - Pursuant to URCP 59(a) (7) . Error in law. 
i 
Motion to Alter or Amend 
2. To alter or amend judgment and orders - Defendant: also 
moved the Court pursuant to URCP 59(e) for an order altering or 
amending said Findings, Conclusions, Order and/or Judgment and 




3. Incorporation of prior motions by reference - Defendant 
also hereby incorporates herein and re-alleges the contents of her 
Motions and Memorandum entitled xxDefendants Memorandum re Motion to 
Correct ruling and to Distribute Additional Assets or For a New 
Trial'' dated 11/3/94," which was entered herein on January 10, 
1995, together with the exhibits and affidavits thereto,1 a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Ex. #1.- Although said motions 
addressed the Court's Ruling, and were prepared prior to entry of 
the Court's Findings, Conclusions, Order and Judgment, Order on 
Post Trial Motions, etc., since there was little change from the 
Court's Ruling, the matters argued therein also apply to the 
Court's Findings, Conclusions, Order and Judgment, Order en Fes-
Trial Motions, etc. mentioned above. Reference thereon :o the 
Court's Ruling is hereby amended to refer to the Court's Findings, 
Conclusions, Order and Judgment, Order on Post Trial Motions, etc. 
4. Order on Post Trial Motions purports to deny defendant's 
11/3/94 motions which were reserved by the Court - At the 11/4/94 
hearing, the Court declined to consider oral argument raised zj 
defendant's 11/3/94 motion, and invited defendant to bring those 
matters before the Court after entry of the Findings, Conclusions 
1
 A copy of defendant's 11/3/94 memorandum is attached 
hereto as Ex. #1. 
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and Order. To the extent that the uOrder on Post Trial Motions 
purports to deny defendant's motions contained therein, defendant 
moves the Court for an order vacating said order and permitting 
oral argument of the matters asserted in defendant's 11/3/94 
motion, Exhibit #1 hereto. 
D 
Supporting Affidavits, Exhibits, Memorandum, etc. 
5. Supporting documents - The above-mentioned motions are 
supported by this Memorandum of Authorities and by the affidavits 
of defendant (below), of Paul Shields,2 of Robert Hunter* and 
exhibits thereto, together with testimony and exhibits received 
evidence at the trial of this matter. 
E 
Matters to which Defendant's Motions pertain 
6. Findings, Conclusions, Judgment & Orders, Order on Post 
Trial Motions, etc. to which defendant's motions pertain 
Defendant's motions pertain to the Court's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment entered in the abcve-
entitled matter about 1/10/95; also to the Court's Order en ?:s: 
Trial Motions entered herein about 1/25/95; and generally to all 
A copy of which is filed herewith as Exhibit #2. 
A copy of which is filed herewith as Exhibit #3. 
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or tie Courts orders and decisions with respect to cistrioution or 
assets, payment of income raxes which may be incurred as a result 
of the Court's decision, the award of alimony and child support, 
payment of expert witness fees, attorney fees and costs, life 
insurance, mandatory income withholding, and to other orders which 
pertain to financial matters. 
Dated February 6, 1995. 
DAVID PAUL WHITE and RONALD C. BARKER 
Attorneys for defendant 
BV: (P^n^Uj £ SU^L, 
Ronald C. Barker 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, of the Affidavits of Paul Shields and Robert Hunter, and 
of exhibits thereto to be mailed, postage prepaid, and/or to be 
hand delivered the 6th day of February, 1995 to Ann L. Wasserman, 
Esq., LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON, 426 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, and/or to be transmitted via FAX #(801) 575-7834. 
Donald C. Barker 
EXHIBIT "C 
David Paul White, #3441 \ 
Attorney for Defendant 
7434 South State St. #102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone (801) 566-8188 
Ronald C. Barker, #0208 
Co-Counsel for Defendant 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone (801) 486-9636 
Attorneys for defendant 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo— 
DALE P. HOLT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VICKI L. HOLT, 
Defendant. 
ORDER IN RE: DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGMENT, 
FOR A NEW TRIAL, ETC. 
Case No. 934700554 DA 
Judge W. Brent West 
--00O00--
This matter came on for hearing on February 14, 1995. The 
hearing was conducted by conference call, the Honorable W. Brent 
West presiding. Participants in the call were the Court, Ann L. 
Wassermann, counsel for Plaintiff, Ronald L. Barker and David Paul 
White, counsel for Defendant. The Court having reviewed the Motion 
of the Defendant to correct judgment, for a new trial, etc., having 
reviewed the Memorandum, and the two errata to the 
Memorandum, and the Court having considered the comments of 
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counsel, and being fully 'advised, now makes and enters the 
following Findings and Order: 
1. The Court finds that some of the matters raised by the 
Defendant were previously considered and heard by the Court on 
November 4, 1994 and that the additional matters presented by 
defendant's motion have not persuaded the Court to change its prior 
ruling. Accordingly, the Order on post-trial motions previously 
entered by the Court should stand as, entered except as modified in 
5 3 below. 
2. The Court finds that the Defendant has failed to produce 
any new evidence with regard to assets of the parties. 
3. Each of the parties is awarded ownership of \ of the 
cemetery lots. 
4. Defendant's motion for a new trial is hereby denied. 
DATED this 2\~~ day of S&btAxrr?, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE W. BRENT WEST 
District Court Judge 
AS 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing revised proposed ORDER IN RE: 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGMENT, FOR A NEW TRIAL, ETC., this 
24th day of February, 1995, to: 
ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
3 
E. PAUL WOOD - 3537 
ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
Attorneys for Dale P. Holt, 
Appellee and Cross Appellant 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
DALE P. HOLT, 
Plaintiff, Appellee 
and Cross Appellant, 
VICKIE L. HOLT, 
Defendant, Appellant 
and Cross Appellee 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
APPELLEE'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
Case No. 950169-CA 
Judge 
ooOoo 
Appellee/Cross Appellant, .Dale P. Holt, by and through 
his undersigned attorneys of record, submits this Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of his Motion to Strike portion's 
of Appellant Mrs. Holt's Brief. This Memorandum shall show that 
Mrs. Holt has included evidence in her Brief which was not 
considered by the trial court in its rulings, which under Utah law 
should not be considered on appeal. 
MRS. HOLT'S APPEAL BRIEF CONTAINING EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN 
CONNECTION WITH A RULE 59 MOTION AFTER TRIAL SHOULD BE STRICKEN 
Significant portions of both text, footnotes and 
appendices of Mrs. Holt's Brief on Appeal contain evidence which 
was not before the trial court at the time of its ruling. The 
evidence was submitted in connection with Mrs. Holt's Rule 59 
Motion one month after the court entered its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment. Trial in the matter was 
held June 13-15, 1994 and Post-Trial Motions to clarify the records 
were submitted November 4, 1994 with a Hearing on the Motions held 
November 5, 1994. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and 
Judgment on the trial and hearing were entered by the court January 
4, 1995. A subsequent Order on Post-Trial Motions was entered by 
the Court January 20, 1995. Mrs. Holt filed a Rule 59 Motion to 
Alter or Amend Pleadings and for a New Trial February 2, 1995. The 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted in support thereof 
contains Affidavits of Paul Shields and Robert H. Hunter with 
numerous exhibits. On March 21, 1995, the trial court denied Mrs. 
Holt's Motion. Mrs. Holt appealed the trial court's Judgment and 
Order. Mrs. Holt Appeal Brief contained numerous citations and 
references to the Memorandum of Points and Authorities and attached 
exhibits submitted with the Rule 59 Motion February 2, 1995, which 
were not before the court at trial. 
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Both this court and the Utah Supreme Court have on 
several occasions held that evidence submitted in a Brief on Appeal 
which was not before the trier of fact must be excluded from 
consideration in the appeal process. In Mauqhn v. Maughn, 770 P. 2d 
156 (Utah App. 1989), the Plaintiff/Appellant husband included 
projected income losses in his Reply Brief which had not been 
previously admitted into evidence at trial. The Court of Appeal 
granted the Appellee's Motion to Strike the entire Brief. In 
Territorial Savings & Loan Association v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452 (Utah 
App. 1989), the parties filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 
and the trial court granted the Mortgagor's Motion. The Mortgagee 
appealed. At the trial court level, prior to consideration of the 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the Mortgagee failed to submit the 
deposition of a witness named John Baird and moved to supplement 
the record on appeal prior to oral argument. The Utah Court of 
Appeals held: 
Thus, the trial court did not have John 
Baird's deposition before it when it granted 
the Trustee's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Evidence not available to the trial judge 
cannot be added to the record on Appeal, 
Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates, Inc., 
739 P.2d 634, 635-36 (Utah App. 1987), and 
thus we deny [the mortgagee's] Motion to 
Supplement. Accordingly, we consider only 
facts properly before the trial court, 
notwithstanding that both parties to this 
action repeatedly cite to Baird's Deposition 
in their Appellant Briefs. Territorial 
Savings & Loan Association v. Baird at 455-56. 
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Also see Chapman v. Chapman, 728 P.2d 121, 123 
(Utah 1986); Govert Copier Painting v. Van 
Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 170 (Utah App. 1990); 
Jackson v. Remington Park, Inc., 874 P.2d 814, 
815 (Okla App. 1994) . 
CONCLUSION 
Since the trial court did not have before it the argument 
or evidence contained in Mrs. Holt's Rule 59 Motion when making 
decisions on the merits of the case, this Court should strike those 
portions of Mrs. Holt's Appeal Brief making reference to the 
argument or evidence contained in the Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities and attachments submitted with the Rule 59 Motion. 
DATED this 7-lt ^ day of May, 1996. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
MM (\ 
By:TE. Paul Wood, Esq. 
Attorneys for Dale P. Holt 
Appellee and Cross Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true copy 
of the foregoing, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
of Motion to Strike, this $^•& day of May, 1996, to: 
RONALD C. BARKER 
287 0 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692 
DAVID PAUL WHITE 
5278 Pinemont Drive, #A-200 
Murray, Utah 84123 
DL^L/CV-\ -2/t^ c, ESt^t/c^-' 
w5\holt.mem 
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